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Introduction 
 
There has been publicly-funded health research in the UK for just over 100 years, but the idea that 
the National Health Service needs to commission some of it is only a generation old. The focus of 
this seminar is how the present organisation of R&D in the English NHS, centred around the 
National Institute for Health Research, came about. 
A good starting point is the seminal 1988 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology report: Priorities in Medical Research. The Government response was the appointment 
in 1991of Michael Peckham as the first Director of NHS R&D, the publication of the first strategy, 
and the identification of a budget. The 1991Strategy was a broad vision of the need to 'introduce a 
sensible mechanism for handling within the NHS the output of basic and applied research and to 
apply research methods to examine the content and delivery of health care'. Peckham used this 
vision to secure a Ministerial commitment to build investment in R&D to 1.5% of the NHS budget. 
Among the ways this first strategy crystallised emerging ideas in health research – and set the tone 
for later strategies – was by embracing evidence-based medicine. The R&D Programme established 
the UK Cochrane Centre for the production of systematic reviews, and the Health Technology 
Assessment programme. Another element which caught the prevailing mood was the involvement 
of patients and the public in research design, a process which was to develop into the INVOLVE 
programme. 
NHS R&D has not developed in a political vacuum. The backdrop to its early years was the 
implementation of NHS reforms creating the purchaser-provider split and the internal market. This 
made managers focus more on the direct and indirect costs of research, and many researchers were 
anxious about NHS support for research being withdrawn. On the positive side, this forced a clearer 
identification of where research money was spent, and a questioning of how it was deployed. 
Labour governments from 1997-2010 maintained the purchaser-provider split. When, after 2000, 
they invested growing amounts in the NHS, these rising budgets made structural changes to the 
distribution of research funds much more palatable for the potential losers than would otherwise 
have been the case. 
The R&D programme’s promise of delivering new evidence about effective health care appealed to 
New Labour politicians, whose programme emphasised ‘investment for reform’ and ‘what works’. 
R&D outputs were used by NICE, the new National Institute for Clinical Excellence, and in new 
National Service Frameworks. This helped make a case for further investments in R&D, beginning 
in 2000 with a National Cancer Research Network, which in turn provided a template for clinical 
research networks in other fields. These networks provided local NHS support for research such as 
the infrastructure for clinical trials.  
Policy decisions about the NHS also affected R&D in unintended ways. The first R&D programme 
had a strong regional component: the removal of Regional Health Authorities in 1996, and the 
abolition of any regional tier of management by 2003, removed the regional parts of the R&D 
infrastructure. The centre had little alternative but to run the essential programmes itself (though 
obliged by headcount ceilings to contract these out). This set the shape for the centralised research 
management which followed. 
Government industrial policies also influenced NHS R&D. By 2000 the view was prevalent in 
Whitehall that R&D was an effective driver of growth and that, given the size of the pharmaceutical 
sector in the UK economy, measures to support its R&D would particularly benefit the UK 
economy. Britain’s centralised NHS was seen as an opportunity to organise clinical trials more 
effectively, which had to be seized by initiatives to improve the NHS’ support for trials. The cancer 
network showed how recruitment to trials could be greatly increased. Leaders of NHS R&D, from 
John Pattison onwards, not only saw the force of these arguments but also recognised that they gave 
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NHS R&D greater leverage in Whitehall and the promise of access to more funds. A turning point 
came in the 2004 Budget, which began a sustained increase in NHS R&D – and Medical Research 
Council – allocations. NHS R&D funding continued to grow in real terms even after 2008, despite 
austerity elsewhere.  
This policy focus on industry drew attention to the question of the type of health research most 
needing support. Researchers had begun to distinguish between fundamental science; clinical 
science about how to deliver the most effective care; and translational research bridging the gap 
between the two. Mounting emphasis on support for trials, and the growth of a more managerial 
approach to research, prioritising measurable benefit, raised the issue of whether funding should be 
re-prioritised towards the translational and clinical parts of the research pipeline. This produced 
tensions between the MRC and the NHS R&D programme between 2004 and 2006. 
One of the requirements of a well-functioning health research system is a career structure which 
retains and supports the best clinician scientists. In the 1980s and 1990s there was increasing 
concern that this was missing, as numbers began to drop. The Academy of Medical Sciences 
(established in 1998) was among those proposing remedies, above all in reports published in 2002 
and 2003. The Wellcome Trust, and Mark Walport, were instrumental in securing improvement, for 
example by extending the range of Fellowships: in 2005 Walport led a review of NHS medical 
academic career structures. The creation and funding of a better career ladder for researchers was 
one of the key components of the NIHR’s research strategy. 
Many witnesses have told us that the single most important development in NHS R&D during the 
period was the centralisation of the budget and its management on new lines. Formerly, much NHS 
research expenditure was not separately identified, and quality control varied greatly from place to 
place. Central allocations were made on a historic basis which favoured a small number of 
hospitals, mainly in London, and neglected such fields as primary care and mental health. The 1994 
Culyer Report laid down principles of accountability and transparency in funding, and led to major 
efforts to identify and quantify where research spending took place. In the following years, 
however, the Department of Health had other priorities than facing the political challenge of 
redistributing funds, and progress was slow. 
The consensus among research leaders was that only incremental change would be politically 
possible. This consensus was broken by Sally Davies and Russell Hamilton, who became Director 
and Deputy Director of NHS R&D at the start of 2005. Their view, based for example on a 
Research and Development Directorate ‘peer review’ exercise in 2001-02, was that only a ‘big 
bang’ approach to redistribution could overcome the opposition of vested interests. The prize for 
success would be control over the large sums of identified NHS research spending, and the ability 
to deploy them in support of a strategy for the whole NHS research system. 
This was set out in Best Research for Best Health, published for consultation in 2005 and in final 
form in January 2006. The strategy included extending Clinical Research Networks, new funding 
programmes, and more support for researchers’ careers. Research funding, by the end of a three-
year transition period, would be allocated competitively, following peer review. The higher profile 
central management needed for this would in future be badged as the National Institute for Health 
Research, an NHS organisation but managed as before from the Department of Health as a 
distributed virtual institute. This NIHR came into being in April 2006. 
The Treasury, which had supported these developments, moved to cement the economic benefits by 
commissioning David Cooksey to review UK health research funding. Their particular concern was 
that NHS R&D and MRC research should interact smoothly, for example to secure as much high 
quality translational research as possible. In December 2006 Cooksey’s report endorsed NIHR and 
made recommendations on support for commercial research, strengthening translational research 
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and greater co-ordination of funders in a new Office for the Strategic Co-ordination of Health 
Research (OSCHR), which was established soon afterwards under John Bell. Cooksey wanted 
translational and clinical research to expand, funded by new money rather than at the expense of the 
MRC’s fundamental research: this hope was realised in the buoyant funding environment of the 
following years. 
In the years immediately following, NIHR opened a range of funding programmes using the 
redistributed and new NHS research funds. The first Biomedical Research Centres were 
competitively selected in 2007. Much effort went into the quality of research management, for 
example standards of peer review, and this undoubtedly helped secure favourable funding 
settlements by convincing Treasury that the programmes gave good value for money. Working 
within and beyond OSCHR, the NIHR, MRC and the other key funders such as Wellcome 
developed more adaptable, fluid ways of working together. These successes have been neither 
complete nor easily-won, but the consensus among our witnesses and other commentators has been 
that NHS R&D is in a much healthier condition now than twenty or thirty years ago. 
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Areas for Discussion 
 
Origins 
How did the evidence-based medicine movement make its breakthrough into significant influence 
on research policy makers in England?  
Why, of all the present-day programmes, did Health Technology Assessment appear first? Did it 
just have effective advocates or was there a deeper reason?  
Of the different discontents of health research in the 1980s, which ones influenced subsequent 
policies most?  
What are the key parts of Michael Peckham’s legacy – for instance the idea of a research strategy; 
stewardship of a research budget; features of content (such as the choice of priorities) and style 
(emphasis on regions, primary care, patients and public)?  
How did the changing NHS context and government policy affect the development of NHS R&D 
after 1991?  
How much difference did new policies under the 1997 Labour government make?  
The emergence of the present NHS research system  
‘All the stars were aligned’ – but what features of the circumstances of 2005 were essential/made 
the most difference?  
The idea that there was one interconnected health research system was new – where did it come 
from? What impact did it have?  
How did the Department of Health succeed in centralising R&D funding?  
What models or forerunners shaped the way the post-2000 clinical research networks provided 
support for research in the NHS?  
Why was NIHR given the particular organisational form it took in 2006? What have been the 
results of this choice?  
Interactions with the wider world of health research  
How has the MRC’s interaction with NHS R&D developed since c.2000?  
Do the post-2005 arrangements better support the translation of ideas from basic and clinical 
research into the development of new products and treatments? How?  
How has the health care industries’ ability to do research in the NHS developed since 2005?  
What roles have the Wellcome Trust and the Academy of Medical Sciences played in the 
development of NHS R&D?  
What are the best features of the present arrangements for co-operation between research funders, 
including charities, and how have they been arrived at? What part has the Office for the Strategic 
Co-Ordination of Health Research played? 
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Impact 
[The first four questions look at the fields of activity selected in Best Research for Best Health in 
2005] 
How has the experience of doing NHS-commissioned research changed as a result of competition 
for NHS research funding, peer review and greater accountability?  
What has the impact of the post-2005 changes like Biomedical Research Centres and the Research 
Facilities programme been on NHS research infrastructure and facilities?  
What has been the contribution of NHS research systems [i.e. Research Governance Systems and 
Research Information Systems]?  
What has the impact of establishing the NIHR Faculty been on research careers?  
What has the payback been for the investment in the new NHS R&D system?  
In the early 2000s the goal was to keep pharmaceutical trials in the UK by providing excellent trials 
infrastructure. What have we achieved?  
How well have we used the results of NHS R&D?  
 NICE 
 other successes such as National Service Frameworks  
 research on service delivery and organisation  
 impact on commissioners and providers of care? 
What difference have CLAHRCs1, AHSCs2, and AHSNs3 made?  
What explains NHS R&D’s ability (and the MRC’s) to secure better funding settlements since 2004 
than most of the public sector?  
What is your assessment of what has been achieved?  
What lessons does experience since 2005 provide for research programme managers today? 
What should NHS R&D be doing next? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Centres for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care 
2 Academic Health Science Centres 
3 Academic Health Science Networks 
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Witness Seminar Transcript 
 
Paul Atkinson 
I would like to begin by thanking everybody very sincerely for braving the weather.  Some people 
have come a particularly long way and that has been hard for some [in the current weather 
conditions].  Thank you very much for being here.  I am Paul Atkinson and I am a historian at the 
University of Liverpool.   
I would like to welcome you to this witness seminar on the origins of the National Institute for 
Health Research, part of a programme of research on the history of medicine at the University of 
Liverpool, and the University is funding this project.  A witness seminar, as some of you will know 
very well, is an event for gathering testimony about events from those who were present.  Nick, our 
chairman, will be taking us through a series of topics and questions that we would like to discuss 
with you to hear your input, and that is all that the day is for. 
The goal of the project is to try to get us to a deeper understanding of how it is that we got here, 
principally, perhaps, to help guide future policy on the support of research and development.  There 
is one person who would have been here but is not and that is Walter Holland, the professor of 
clinical epidemiology and social medicine at St Thomas’, who accepted our invitation but as most 
of you will know sadly died a couple of weeks ago.  I had the pleasure of interviewing Walter and I 
know he would have been a lively contributor as well.  That is all I need to say to get us started.  I 
would like to just introduce Nick Timmins, who is a senior fellow at the Institute for Government 
and at the King’s Fund, and formerly public policy editor at the Financial Times.  I hand it over to 
you, Nick. Thank you. 
Nick Timmins  
It is lovely to see you here and congratulations for making it in the snow.  I am very impressed.  We 
are going to do NIHR.  I have had the happy privilege of chairing a number of these witness 
seminars.  The difference this time is that I know less about the subject and I know fewer of you so, 
when you want to speak, stick your hands up, wave and tell me who you are and what you want to 
contribute.  We are doing four sessions: on the origins, the emergence of the present system, the 
interactions with the wider world and its impact since it was all created.  There are people on the 
top table but that is just so there are people on the top table.  It is not necessarily that they are more 
important at any point and we will move them around so it is very important that you all contribute. 
 
Origins 
To get going on origins, NIHR comes out of, in a sense, the evidence-based medicine movement 
and that began to emerge in the 1980s.  How did it grow and how did it come to have an impact on 
policy?  Would you like to start, Iain? 
Iain Chalmers  
Yes. I probably ought to start by challenging that perception.  Basically, the NHS R&D programme 
from a long time previously had shown a respect for applied research to guide decisions within 
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health services and within clinical practice.  Indeed, it is easy to point, for example, to Archie 
Cochrane’s book published in 1972, which was 20 years before the term ‘evidence-based medicine’ 
was coined by Gordon Guyatt at McMaster University in 1992. 
There was a tradition of applied research funded through the R&D programme of the Department of 
Health.  I worked in a unit which was funded from a centrally commissioned programme called the 
National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit.  In some senses, some of the things that were going on in 
other countries were not going on here, things that I think are relevant to this discussion.  For 
example, the clinical epidemiology movement did not take hold in this country.  I know that the 
Rockefeller Foundation tried to get British participation in INCLEN, but I think Southampton was 
probably the only medical school that did get involved in that movement.  The same was the case 
with health technology assessment.  There was not British participation in health technology 
assessment in a formal sense, despite the fact that there was plenty of health technology assessing 
going on, until the HTA programme was founded.  There were these separate strands happening and 
indeed, when evidence-based medicine was, as it were, launched in this country as a term, it caused 
a lot of what is probably best described as ‘backlash’. 
Nick Timmins  
What sort of date would you put that? 
Iain Chalmers  
It was about 1993 or 1994 – something like that.  For example – I can relate this with some 
confidence because I have had it from the people who were involved – there was a Lancet editorial 
entitled ‘Evidence-Based Medicine – In Its Place’ and it was a very personal attack on David 
Sackett from McMaster and Brian Haynes from McMaster.4  I know, from the editor of the Lancet 
who handled that, that the Regius Professor of Physic in Cambridge said to him, ‘Good for you in 
putting the boot into these people who are implying that we have not been guided by evidence’. 
Keith Peters  
The Regius Processor of Physic in Cambridge, the aforesaid person, is me actually. 
Iain Chalmers 
Good to see you here, Keith. [Laughter] 
Keith Peters 
You might be interested to hear my perspective on my support for the then-editor of the Lancet.  
First, just to get it out of the way, Archie Cochrane of course was an MRC employee and the 
director of the MRC was in Cardiff, which was my medical school, and I knew him from my 
medical student days in the late 1950s.  His support for evidence-based medicine, the use of the 
randomised control trial, was imbued into us as medical students, so the notion that this is a 1980s 
invention is, to say the least, somewhat exaggerated. 
                                                 
4 ‘Evidence-based medicine, in its place.’ Lancet (London, England), 0140-6736, 1995 Sep 23, Vol. 346, 
Issue 8978, p. 785. 
10 
 
The real reason behind my immediate antipathy to David Sackett arose from an event when I 
invited him to come to Cambridge to discuss cases at the Grand Round.  He accepted the invitation 
but only on condition that certain diseases were actually presented, so the limits of evidence-based 
medicine in dealing with ordinary clinical practice, where the evidence of the kind that Sackett 
wanted did not exist and often does not exist to this day, was actually one of the reasons for putting 
it into perspective.  We have, in the audience, Mike Rawlins, whose marvellous dissection of the 
limits of this kind of scientific approach to clinical decision-making, the gold standard of the 
randomised control trial as distinct from the problems of evaluating events in the real world and 
patients being individuals who do not fit the category that fell into the randomised control trial, was 
behind the sentiment that I evinced at the time, just to get it on the record. 
Iain Chalmers  
It is very good that it is on the record and I rather wish that Richard Horton was here so that he 
could give his account of it as well.  We would maybe get a triangulation of what actually was said.  
I never claimed to be associated with the evidence-based medicine movement because I stopped 
being a proper doctor in 1973.  I did not have to take decisions where I could find out the extent to 
which the principles of evidence-based medicine as set out by the group in McMaster in particular 
worked in practice.  I was very clear that I was interested in the type of evidence that was available 
for people to take into account, but I did not have any credibility and should not have had any 
credibility in describing how well it worked in practice. 
What I can say, though, is that there was a great deal of opposition: for example, the principle of 
trying to base decisions or in any way inform decisions, not just on a single study, but on systematic 
reviews of similar studies, was roundly rejected.  Certainly I hope that there is someone here from 
the Wellcome Trust, because I can actually point to the data on this.  It was roundly rejected as not 
important.  I think that was a very bad mistake made by those people who opposed this.  It is still a 
problem, in fact, that new research starts without adequate assessment of what is known already 
from existing evidence.  That is a great shame because it wastes money as well as doing wrong 
research, and those were the sort of principles that went along with the idea of evidence-based 
medicine.  It was not randomised trials.  It was systematic reviews. 
Keith Peters 
When David Sackett came to Oxford systematic reviews had not started.5 
Sally Davies 
Well, hang on a minute.  You are both going down a rabbit hole because – and John will be able to 
address this bit better than me – it was Lord Walton and the House of Lords that reviewed research 
in the NHS and it was not about evidence-based medicine as I remember it.6 It was about the fact 
that if we invested so much in health services then we should have an intelligent commissioning 
arm that made sure we had research to address our needs, and arising out of that we got the NHS 
R&D programme and Michael Peckham was the first director. 
                                                 
5 But see Iain Chalmers’ comment on p. 15. 
6 The reference here is in fact to the 1988 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, ‘Priorities in Medical Research’, when the committee was chaired by Lord Nelson of Stafford. 
Dame Sally has conflated this here with the Committee’s 1995 report under Lord Walton, ‘Medical 
Research and the NHS Reforms’. 
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Nick Timmins  
That is the Lords Select Committee in 1988 we are talking about.   
Sally Davies 
Yes. 
Keith Peters 
I was a special advisor to that committee.7 
Nick Timmins  
John, what is your take on this? 
John Pattison  
I can only agree with that.  That is how I imagined that NHS R&D came into being: that you have a 
service that is based on science and technology and you cannot afford not to have an R&D 
programme that goes with that.  I cannot really add very much else.  There are others here who were 
there before I was but, by the time I got there, there had been two directors of NHS R&D: Michael 
Peckham and John Swales.  Many programmes were in place so I feel rather inadequate in 
addressing the origins.  For example, Chris had been there years before that. 
Chris Henshall  
I think a strand that is a key part of this is the management of the NHS and their requirement for 
knowledge, understanding and advice.  I think the Lords were very much a customer-driven model.  
They said, ‘We have this huge scientific-based enterprise, which is a customer for information and 
it should not expect to get everything it needs from the external providers of information because 
they have slightly different agendas.  It needs its own R&D capacity.’  I think the customer, implicit 
in the Lords report and explicit in Mike Peckham’s early strategy, was both the clinician and the 
management.  A range of customers were seen. 
The tradition, as well as whatever we are going to call it – evidence-based medicine, clinical trials 
or whatever – that the NHS R&D programme was able to draw upon was the traditional operational 
research, which had been alive and well in the central Department of Health on behalf of the NHS.  
This includes, for example, work commissioned about the cost-effectiveness of heart 
transplantation which led to the establishment of quite a controversial, expensive programme.  
Regions were doing their own stuff.  Regions were very powerful at that stage: decisions about 
development and siting of hospitals, purchasing of high-tech equipment, CT scans and things.  
These were being informed by economic and operations research by units such as the Centre for 
Health Economics at York working locally.  A lot of these groups and universities set up their local 
units to support their local NHS.  I think that was part of the foundation that was being drawn on. 
                                                 
7 Sir Keith was specialist adviser on the 1995, not the 1988, Report. 
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Nick Timmins  
What period are you talking about then?  The issue I want to raise is the 1988 report, it’s ahead of 
the purchase-provider split in the NHS but you are still talking about this as though the NHS should 
look at this as a customer. 
Chris Henshall  
I think that is what the Lords were saying in their own language.  It does not require a 
purchaser-provider split to separate the purchaser: you have someone making decisions about 
service development, about allocation of money, development of what we now call the National 
Service Frameworks.  We have people making decisions about clinical architecture, management 
architecture and infrastructure, whether or not you put them in a separate box and call them 
purchasers.  In a way, the research function still needs to support those decisions.  The customer-
provider split was a useful way for Mike Peckham in the early strategy to play into a theme that was 
there which is, ‘My goodness, we have created these commissioners.  How on earth are they going 
to find out what to do?  Where are they going to get advice from?’ 
Nick Timmins 
Yes and this is one of the few bits that I do think I recall.  When the purchaser-provider split 
happened a number of things broke down.  Tell me if I am wrong, but there used to be arrangements 
in teaching hospitals known as ‘knock for knock’ where clinical academics would do NHS service 
work and would not get charged for it, and NHS consultants would do academic work and it was all 
‘knock for knock’.  It was kind of assumed that it came out in the wash.  One of the effects of the 
purchaser-provider split was that managers started saying, ‘I am not sure how I am going to pay for 
that.  It is part of my overhead’, so that arrangement started to fall apart.  Is that right?  Yes.  People 
are nodding their heads. 
Sally Davies 
There was still SIFTR in the system. 
Keith Peters 
It was a very arbitrary calculation indeed. 
Sally Davies 
Yes, historically. 
Keith Peters 
SIFT was based upon a basket of costs of teaching hospitals compared to other hospitals, and then 
the cost was attributed to the extra cost of teaching and research, but of course it was not due to 
that.  It was often due to specialist services and a whole pile of other things.  SIFTR was invented as 
a way of defending the R bit against the effects of the internal market and that was arbitrarily 
defined, as I recall, at 25% of the original SIFT, which itself was an arbitrary figure.  The other 
thing, which I saw mentioned in the write-up, was the loss of the regions, which actually played a 
major part in sustaining the, if you like, research operation of the NHS generally with a lot of 
devolved budgeting.  That, certainly in some parts of the world, was a major contributor to the 
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development of new services and medical schools etc.  Once they disappeared, life got more 
complicated. 
Nick Timmins 
Right, but that was a bit later.  The regions did not go for a while. 
Sally Sheard 
I just want to bring us a little bit further back in time.  I know people are not comfortable going 
back beyond the last 20-odd years but I examined Stephen Davies’ PhD thesis late last year, which 
focussed on the 1970s, Rothschild and the idea of the customer.  I just thought it might be nice to 
have on record some reflection on how we got from Rothschild up to the point that people had been 
talking about so far.  Stephen, could you just give us a couple of pithy comments on it? 
Nick Timmins 
Yes, just ten thousand words down to two hundred. 
Stephen Davies 
Well, in fact it went back to the 1960s so I would say that the real origins of a DH and NHS R&D 
were at the beginning of the 1960s.  They were prompted by the need for evidence and knowledge 
which was, to quote the first chief scientist, Richard Cohen, of a precise and practical relevance to 
the NHS.  The start of this was really all about operational research, as Chris Henshall has said, but 
it was always a multi-stranded project which included operational, service-orientated medical and 
social research.  It is probably best characterised in the way it was at the time as being a programme 
of health and personal social services research.  All that grew strongly in the 1960s from a very low 
base and the idea of the customer was actually already around before Rothschild, so the Department 
of Health invented the idea of the customer and identified the need to have internal customers for 
research as early as 1967. 
Rothschild then came along with his own ideas of customers for research plus the very contentious 
proposal to move 25% of the MRC budget to the Department of Health to pay for the 
commissioning of biomedical research.  At that point, the whole story gets overlaid with the politics 
of medical research, biomedical research, and gets a lot more complicated.  However, I think it is 
completely wrong, given all of that, to say all this started even in 1988.  It started in the 1960s.  It 
was very successful.  It was destabilised by the unintended consequences of the Rothschild reforms 
in the 1970s, and then the department continued with its programme of health and personal social 
services research in the 1980s, but in a much colder climate, financially and politically. 
Nick Timmins 
I have forgotten the date but the Department of Health appointed its first health economists a lot 
earlier than the 80s.  Somewhere in the 70s. 
Sally Sheard 
1971. 
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Stephen Davies 
Yes.  The economic advisor’s office and operational research were the internal resources but that 
was always separate from the commissioned programme of research, which was largely 
extramurally provided. 
Chris Henshall 
On the episode in the 70s and 80s, following the Rothschild movement of money, a chief scientist 
at the Department of Health, I think one Arthur Buller, made a decision as his staff was further 
reduced year on year that the Department of Health was not competent to manage the money it had 
been given under the Rothschild arrangement, so a proportion of it was returned to the MRC under 
the arrangement of the so-called concordat.  Although that is a little bit of a detail of history, I think 
in terms of the ethos it is really important. 
I joined the MRC as a young scientific secretary and my job was to manage the Health Services 
Research Committee, which was a kind of war zone, really, between the Department of Health and 
the MRC.  The Department of Health says, ‘You keep saying you do what we ask but you do not’ 
and the MRC kept saying, ‘You do not know what you ask for.  You do not know what you want 
and you ask for silly things so we do sensible things’.  This was the annual concordat meeting, put 
in polite language.  Sally [Davies] and others later turned around something that really had quite a 
history of acrimony behind it, and I think that took a long time to turn around and you need to 
understand that bit of history to understand just what was achieved by the setting up of the NIHR 
and its really positive working relationship with the MRC, because I think there was a period of 
some considerable tension. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes.  You are right.  It triggers some memories, that.  I remember almost public rows between the 
MRC and DH about what was being commissioned and not commissioned, and whether it was right 
or not.   
Brian Edwards 
I was at that time a manager.  I have two things to say.  This is about the National Institute for 
Health Research but, well before that, other organisations and regions in particular were investing 
in research and in the universities.  I remember in Trent we put a lot of money into our three 
medical schools in order to get them to prepare the skills and the staff who could begin to answer 
our questions as well.  I remember, when Michael Peckham first came to his meeting of regional 
general managers, the first question we asked was, ‘Where is the evidence that small units are 
dangerous?’  We were all in the business of then consolidating ophthalmology, ENT and all the rest 
of it. 
To be fair to him, he said, ‘I do not think there is any but we will go and have a look, and if there is 
not any we will go and commission some’.  That changed the mood and the attitude, I think, 
amongst managers and researchers, because suddenly they were going to give us some answers 
which might turn out to be helpful.   
I also have with me the minutes of a meeting of the NHS Policy Board in March 1991, so we have a 
precise date.  This is Michael Peckham reporting to ministers, senior officials in the Department of 
Health, regional managers and others: ‘We need a more thorough approach to bring new treatments 
into regular use.  It is clear that the selection of treatments from those available was not based on an 
analysis of their effectiveness or their cost-effectiveness.  There is a tendency for new treatments to 
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slip into practice without evaluation.  There was a need for properly controlled trials’.  He gave, as 
an example, the new use of lasers, to obviate the need for hysterectomy.  This was a potentially 
beneficial procedure that carried with it serious risks.  Now, this was 1991 and this was getting to 
be really interesting material.  The managerial community welcomed it. 
Nick Black 
Going back to the House of Lords, the other factor that always struck me as really important was, as 
I understand it, the House of Lords Select Committee [enquiry] was set up because of concerns 
around largely what we might call clinical research and the state of clinical research, as opposed to 
the research the MRC was funding.  The key thing was that the loudest voices on that committee 
were three or four ex-captains of industry who were shocked at how little information the NHS had 
about research on how to organise services and what was known, a bit like the examples that you 
gave, Brian, about size and so on.  The report actually came out with something rather different.  It 
did say, ‘We need to strengthen clinical research in these ways’ but we also need what I would now 
call health services research, research on how services should be delivered, as well.  That was not 
expected and that was largely driven by people who had run large manufacturing companies such as 
Courtaulds, who were shocked to see how little money was invested in R&D by this huge 
enterprise, the NHS. 
Iain Chalmers 
I just wondered if I could get a perspective on Sally’s question, because I was the grateful recipient 
of funds over that period, the transition that you are referring to, so that, for example, as someone 
who worked in the National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit, I had it from the centrally-commissioned 
programme.  It was founded in 1978, but during the 1980s we developed, as part of the programme, 
the programme and systematic reviews, which ended in being referred to by Michael Peckham in 
his 1991 article in the Lancet saying what he would like to see happen.8  The reason that he came to 
know about it, almost certainly, was that he is married to Catherine Peckham and Catherine 
Peckham was an external assessor on one of the external assessments of the National Perinatal 
Epidemiology Unit, and in fact in its 1989 one, where we actually had these big books and the 
electronic publication available.9 
He obviously – I am pretty certain it is fair to say ‘obviously’ – saw this as something that was 
cost-effective: find out what is known already before commissioning new work.  Not only did he 
give support to the idea of the UK Cochrane Centre, which was not going to do reviews itself; it 
was going to try to promote the preparation and use of systematic reviews, which happened, but 
also he established – Chris will I am sure confirm this – the NHS Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination in York, seeing that this was an important trend that should be encouraged.  I think 
that carry over from the 1980s for those trends into something that grew quite a lot during the 1990s 
was a nice bit of continuity.  Things had been, in some senses, piloted during the 1980s. 
                                                 
8 Michael Peckham, ‘Research and Development for the National Health Service.’, Lancet 338, no. 8763 
(1991): 367. 
9 Chalmers I, Enkin M, Keirse MJNC, eds. Effective care in pregnancy and childbirth. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989; Chalmers I. The Oxford Database of Perinatal Trials. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989-1992: (Contents subsequently transferred to and maintained in The Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews.  Cochrane Collaboration and Update Software. 1992, ongoing). 
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Nick Timmins 
We get to Peckham being there and Peckham’s day, and Peckham getting the NHS to commit to 
1.5% resource going into R&D, which was clearly an important moment. 
Sally Davies 
I thought he had got a commitment to 2%.  I always used to tell the politicians that is what they had 
committed to. 
Chris Henshall 
The politicians never committed to anything. 
Sally Davies 
I was told that they had. 
Chris Henshall 
Michael was not prevented from putting a 1.5% figure in one of his announcements and papers, but 
I do not think he ever got ministerial approval for it. 
Sally Davies 
I told them they had committed to it. 
Nick Timmins 
That is known as power and influence I think.  Out of this, we get the Cochrane Centre, the Centre 
for Reviews and Disseminations and we get the Health Technology Assessment programme, which 
corrals a lot of the stuff that we have been talking about.  Can you talk a bit about that, John?  Was 
there a particular logic that led to those, in a sense, being the first three initiatives? 
John Pattison  
I cannot answer that.  I think others who were there at the time of its creation might be able to. 
Tom Walley 
Maybe I can.  The common feature across all of these was the systematic review: the systematic 
reviews from York, from the Cochrane Centre, and, initially when it was set up, the HTA 
programme largely delivered systematic reviews.  It was doing that in part to address the need of 
commissioners for research and it was identifying what it thought were the needs of commissioners 
with their help, with all of the difficulties that brings, and then trying to deliver a product back to 
commissioners. 
However, it became quickly clear that you can only go so far with systematic reviews because there 
were lots of areas where there was no data to synthesise, and therefore the HTA programme started 
to get into the business of generating data as well as analysing other people’s data.  Where it really 
kicked off most strongly was probably around prostatic cancer, where there was a strong push to 
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have a national screening programme for prostate cancer, and there had been an attempt to do a trial 
in prostate cancer, which had been unsuccessful, led by the MRC.  The clinicians simply could not 
get patients to randomise into the trial.  The HTA programme adopted a very pragmatic approach 
and first of all commissioned a couple of systematic reviews – two economic evaluations, and 
fortunately they both came out with the same answer – and then commissioned work around 
evaluating how to approach patients, get them to participate in the trial, and then ultimately into our 
first big trial, which was the ProtecT study, which has reported only last year.10  Therefore, the 
HTA programme moved from a core of systematic reviews, which still pertains today, into doing 
more and more original data-generation using various designs but most commonly the randomised 
control trial. 
Nick Timmins 
Right, and it also started putting money directly into places like Southampton, or into universities, 
to do HTA. 
Tom Walley 
That really came later. 
John Pattison  
It was outsourcing of the management of the HTA. 
Tom Walley  
Yes.  Southampton managed the programme, but in terms of doing the systematic reviews and so 
forth – the HTA programme initially – that was all done on a tender basis, but then as NICE 
developed and the work of NICE developed, we took over the role previously held by the regional 
development and evaluation committees (DEC).  There were four or five of those around the 
country and they were rolled into what became the HTA’s systematic review programme, which 
mainly fed into NICE.  We are now talking 1997 and 1998, so a bit further on. 
Nick Black 
As a supplement to Tom’s point, the other thing looking back which I would say was one of the 
greatest contributions of those early Peckham years was not systematic reviews of treatments but 
very detailed reviews of methods, and that went round the world and it has been used for the 
following 20 years.  For the first time, people looked at anything from randomised trial design right 
through to qualitative methods, and came up with absolutely seminal technical reports, books really, 
which laid out the whole methodological basis for what has gone on ever since. 
Nick Timmins 
How to do it. 
                                                 
10 Hamdy, F.C., et al., ‘10-Year Outcomes after Monitoring, Surgery, or Radiotherapy for Localized 
Prostate Cancer’, New England Journal of Medicine 2016; 375:1415-1424.   
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Nick Black 
How to do it, yes. 
Sally Davies 
Of course all of those reports were open access on the web, so we were pioneers in open access and 
people around the world can get them free of charge. 
Nick Black 
Yes, in the tens of thousands.  It has been absolutely massive. 
Keith Peters 
I think one other feature of those early years, which is worth mentioning, is that medicine for the 
first time was starting to get very expensive, and some of the gadgets that were needed and the costs 
of running them, from early CT scans, early MRIs, could only be afforded in a limited number of 
places.  That transition in medicine from being a relatively cheap discipline to one that we now 
know of as very expensive obviously started in some areas before that – cardiac surgery was 
mentioned as a good example – but I think the realisation that things were going to cost a great deal 
of money and needed to be used intelligently was another force behind the development of the 
assessment of the value of the technology that was expensive. [38’53] 
Nick Timmins 
That is great.  There is a hand up at the back. 
Marc Taylor 
Before I became involved in developing the NIHR I did central finance work for the Department of 
Health.  I wanted to add that although the tendency of this discussion is to focus on, if you like, 
scientific concerns around the assessment of evidence in medicine, it is worth remembering that 
Michael Peckham had a following wind because of the general dissatisfaction about measuring all 
sorts of things.  For example, in those days there was an allocation to regions through a formula in 
which a population was weighted for mortality, and every year there was a lively debate about 
whether any of this was appropriate given some of the changes that we have just been talking about 
and the general lack of evidence about joining one end of health services to any other end.  The 
focus on and worry about testing the quality and bringing together the evidence was not just to do 
with medicine but to do with understanding how to deliver appropriate health services fairly. 
Brian Edwards 
I have just one final example.  I remember Michael stunned a regional general managers’ meeting 
by saying, ‘Gentleman and ladies’ – because there were one or two ladies there – ‘please always 
distinguish between clinical opinion and clinical evidence, and always check that clinical opinion 
has some evidence behind it.  You usually will not find it but always ask for it’.  The final point 
was: the real bombshell for me was when Ken Calman was pushing for cancer centres and 
somebody asked the question, ‘Where is the evidence that cancer centres would produce better 
results?’ and Michael Peckham said, ‘There is not any that I know of but I will go and have a look’.  
That was pretty brave. 
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Nick Timmins 
Yes.  We come to the mid-1990s now and the Culyer report. 
Chris Henshall 
I would just like to provide a very quick footnote.  I think part of the philosophy and the politics 
behind the early structure of Mike Peckham’s programme was that we had better get some early 
results.  Research takes a long time so there was not just a kind of scientific logic to the idea of 
funding reviews.  There was a kind of political reality.  Ministers, having been bounced into 
supposedly agreeing to 1.5%, then started to say, ‘What am I getting for this, Michael?’ and 
Michael said, ‘I will get back to you on that one’ and we went off to Brunel and commissioned 
Martin Buxton to produce what has now become the payback research framework and programme. 
However, there was quite a bit of pressure to deliver.  The early structure of the programme had 
priority research programmes that were trying to focus on what the management and their clinicians 
most needed to know, and there were various topic-based programmes, but then we kind of thought, 
‘We can carry on doing topics for ever and just keep going round in a circle.  Why do we not have 
something more generic like health technology assessment, which is basically trying to find out 
what works?’ 
The first lasting programme was focused very much back to the customer thinking.  The idea of 
using today’s information was enshrined in the first version of the strategy in something that was 
called the ‘information systems strategy’ which was about systems to marshal the existing 
information we have to feed into the system, and the Cochrane Centre was a key part of that.  That 
was felt to be provider-driven.  Cochrane was saying, in our characterisation of it, ‘What have all 
those guys doing trials been doing?  Let’s go and find out what they found out’ and that was 
complemented by the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, which was customer-driven.   
We would rally the questions that the managers and the clinicians were asking and we would go to 
Trevor Sheldon and Alan Maynard at York and say, ‘People want to know the answer to 
incontinence.  There is probably not much in the trial literature but you can liaise with Iain and the 
UK Cochrane Centre and find out, but we need some answers on the best treatment for incontinence 
so go and look beyond the trials’.  The idea of the information systems strategy was ‘jam today as 
well as jam tomorrow’, and we will have a twofold strategy, science-driven and customer-driven, 
and get them to work together.  That was the kind of thinking behind it. [44’00] 
Nick Timmins 
That’s exactly right. 
Iain Chalmers  
Trevor Sheldon and I co-authored a paper for Health Economics which said at greater length what 
Chris has just summarised.11 
                                                 
11 Sheldon T, Chalmers I. The UK Cochrane Centre and the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination: 
respective roles within the Information Systems Strategy of the NHS R&D Programme, coordination and 
principles underlying collaboration. Health Economics 1994; 3:201-203. 
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Sally Sheard 
The political imperative is something that we need to try to pull out as we go through and it is there 
but it is intermittent.  Getting the quick wins was critical for Peckham.  It made me think about a 
parallel, which was the resource management initiative that came out alongside Griffiths in the 
mid-1980s.  Apparently when they went to sell it to Margaret Thatcher and she said, ‘How long is 
this going to take to implement?’, clinical budgeting and all of the stuff that Chantler was doing, 
somebody said to her, ‘It is probably going to take about five to six years’.  Her classic response 
was, ‘That is longer than the Second World War’.  The political imperative is important and I 
would like to get the sense of that as we go through. 
Nick Timmins 
That was the time of the NHS review when Ian Mills and that lot were taking it, and she said, ‘That 
is longer than it took them to win the Second World War’. 
Kieran Walshe 
I just have an observation, Nick, which you might reflect on, given your past role.  This discussion 
that we are having and hearing about in this room was taking place, I think, in parallel to but quite 
separate from the debate about how to organise and manage health services in this country.  I am 
really struck that, in the discussion up until now, things like the introduction of NHS Trusts, the 
various reforms and mergers which Brian will be all too familiar with through the late 80s and 90s, 
the introduction of the purchaser-provider split and all those profoundly important policy concerns 
which drove really big changes in the way that we organised health services were taking place in a 
room over here.  The debate I am hearing in this room was taking place somewhere else and quite 
separate. 
Nick Timmins 
Some of it interacts here because the DECs were developed partly in response to the 
purchaser-provider split because the purchasers, the health authorities and the GPs wanted advice 
on what they should buy so they actually got bigger and stronger.  Is that right?  The DECs emerged 
out of that so it is bit more of a Venn diagram.  I think your point is absolutely valid. 
Brian Edwards 
Yes.  You cannot envisage intelligent commissioning without clear, scientifically evidenced 
guidelines on what should be done.  That all sounds so easy, but the fact is we sat in this room a 
few months ago looking at commissioning; it still has not happened.12  We still cannot really do 
intelligent commissioning apart from in a few very specific areas of healthcare, because the 
evidence is not there.  The systemic reviews were intended to produce guidelines from NICE and 
others, I  agree with you Kieran, it was fairly tenuous and in abstract rather than in reality. 
Kieran Walshe 
There was quite a bit of rhetoric in Michael Peckham’s early documents about an evidence-based, 
knowledge-led, healthcare system, etc, but the reality in those days was that there was not a lot of 
                                                 
12 The University of Liverpool witness seminar on the 1991 NHS internal market. 
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connection.  I guess the question we will come back to is how much more connection there has 
been. 
Sally Davies 
Did Clive Smee not fill that hole? 
Chris Henshall 
In part, he did, yes. [47’56] 
Kieran Walshe 
One man. 
Sally Davies 
He was very important in straddling the worlds as the chief economist and advising the ministers on 
a lot of that.  Clive’s pivotal role, I would argue, was not recognised.  He was very influential. 
Nick Timmins 
Particularly around cost effectiveness questions. 
Keith Peters 
Michael Peckham, whom I admire greatly and I knew very well, exaggerated for effect, on the one 
hand, the lack of, as it were, real understanding by doctors of what they did.  The fact of the matter 
is a great deal of medicine is very well done in the absence of robust evidence and to say to 
managers, ‘They do not really know what they are doing’ was quite a nice move, as it were, but to 
exaggerate the ignorance of medicine, on the one hand, and the power of a scientific technology that 
did not exist, on the other, left him somewhat exposed to criticism.  You might say, ‘Well, they 
would say that, would they not?’ but remember that people have to face the reality of doing 
medicine day by day, seeing patients, making the best decisions they can and people coming along 
and telling the managers, ‘They do not know what they are doing’ is seriously unhelpful. 
Brian Edwards 
Do we know who appointed Michael Peckham? 
John Pattison 
It was a Department of Health appointment. 
Brian Edwards 
Duncan Nichol was present, I think, as the chief exec of the NHS. 
John Pattison 
Yes, he would have been. 
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Sally Sheard 
John, you had something about this in your memoir. 
John Pattison 
Only my own appointment.  I can tell you who was there then and it was the Chief Executive of the 
NHS, the Permanent Secretary, the Chief Scientist and the CMO. 
Nick Black 
Was it advertised? 
John Pattison 
Yes. 
Sally Davies 
Yes.  There were head hunters. 
Nick Black 
No, but going back to Mike? 
Chris Henshall 
Yes, the first director was advertised.  I was working at MRC at the time and MRC was asked to 
suggest people who might be encouraged to apply.  In fact, the folklore was that Mike Peckham’s 
name was put into people’s thoughts by someone senior at the MRC.  He was not much on the map 
of all the things we have been talking about up to now.  He was brought in from outside operational 
research, evidence, whatever we are going to call reviews. 
Nick Black 
He was head of BPMF, so he was not in the wilderness.13 
Keith Peters 
He was a clinical oncologist.  One of his great contributions was the introduction of platinum 
therapy in cancer. 
Nick Timmins 
I want to keep moving, because I thought this would be a short section and instead there is loads of 
interesting stuff pouring out of it, so we need to keep going.  Let us pick up a few more events and 
see if people think they are important.  There is the Culyer report. 
                                                 
13 The British Postgraduate Medical Federation, one of the postgraduate medical schools of the University 
of London from 1947-1996. 
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Sally Davies 
Essential. 
Nick Timmins 
It was essential, yes. 
Sally Davies 
Yes, we could never have set up NIHR without the Culyer report. 
Nick Timmins 
Unfortunately, Tony is not well and cannot be here, so, Sally, do it for him. 
Sally Davies 
Chris always does all this better than me, but the money was getting lost and by doing the Culyer 
review we got a visible budget.  It was not a real budget, as we all know, but it was a visible budget, 
so then you could start to think about where is the budget and what is it doing. 
Nick Timmins 
What is the difference between a visible and a real budget? 
Sally Davies 
A real budget is when you can spend it.  A visible budget is said to be spent, but it is very difficult 
to track whether it is. 
Chris Henshall 
There were two key steps.  The Culyer review set out a number of principles about NHS R&D 
funding, but what it is remembered for, probably, is proposing that the research expenditure should 
somehow be identified and made accountable.  That was an exhortation and a principle and we then 
ran almost a two-year exercise across what was still then a regional structure.  Indeed, I do not think 
it would have worked without a regional structure, with all the regional directors of finance and all 
the power, influence and knowledge in the regional office to run what we called ‘the declaration of 
R&D expenditure’.  We said that we have to find this money and the only people who know where 
it is are the people in the Trusts, because that is where it is, not that they knew where it was, but we 
encouraged them to go and look, to a set of very simple accounting principles that we agreed with 
the regional directors of finance.  That allowed us to say, ‘Here is a notional budget’ and then we 
made it a real notional budget, still not moveable, by doing a zero-based cost movement exercise.  
Hospitals said, ‘I am spending £10 million a year on R&D’.  Up until that point, they were getting 
that £10 million through their purchaser contracts, because that is the only way they got money or at 
least that bit of money.  We said, ‘Okay, from now on, that money is going to come to you centrally 
from an R&D budget and we are going to take it from the purchasers and put it into the R&D 
budget’.  A massive matrix was drawn up of 450 Trusts versus 14 or eight regions or whatever it 
was and all of the purchasers, and all of the declarations in the Trusts were mapped across the 
purchasers they interacted with.  On day zero of the beginning of a financial year, we reduced all 
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those purchasers’ budgets by the amount that had been mapped to them and we created the central 
R&D budget.  As Sally said, it did not mean you could do anything with it, because that money was 
all being spent, it just had a different label on it when it arrived at the Trust.  None of that was in the 
Culyer report; that was what we did to try to turn the theoretical principle in the Culyer report into 
something that was beginning to be a reality, as it were, but it took Sally to figure out how to move 
that money. 
Stephen Davies 
At that time, I was a mid-level finance manager in a teaching hospital and Trust and I can assure 
you that we did not know that the money was being spent; that the declaration, which I personally 
looked after, was an exercise in backward mapping to arrive back at the number that one first 
started with, i.e. the SIFTR allocation.  In that sense, the origins of the budget are in the historical 
artifice of SIFT and SIFTR. 
Chris Henshall 
That was not true of all institutions, some of whom had much more money going in.  There was a 
political game that institutions played, basically who was your money safest with.  The people who 
had huge research expenditures in reality and who thought that the purchasers were an easier win 
than the R&D centrally would be under-declared, so they kept getting the money from the 
purchasers.  The people who thought that the purchasers were going to get tough with them and that 
central R&D would be a safe place to have their money coming from, declared something closer to 
what they were spending.  There was huge political game playing going on. 
Brian Edwards 
It was called gaming the system. 
Sally Davies 
In the regions, it was led by the regional director supported by the finance one and I remember 
going to a number of Trusts and saying, ‘I do not believe your declaration, I think you spend more’ 
or, ‘I think you spend less’ and we came to an accommodation.   
Nick Timmins 
That is an interesting word. 
Marc Taylor 
I was the secretary of the Culyer review and it was a very interesting process because what it 
brought together was people interested in R&D and the financial function and the Chief Medical 
Officer.14  It was a kind of plot between them to produce a convincing report and it was not at all 
clear that ministers would act on the principles of it.  In fact, there was a tipping point.  The 
decision needed to be taken to go ahead and do what Sally said; Brian Mawhinney, the minister at 
the time, was extremely stubborn and a statistician who, once he understood what was going on, 
was offended by it, as anybody in the finance function was also. That was what gave it the force to 
                                                 
14 Refers to Liam Donaldson, who was in fact Regional General Manager of Northern RHA at that point, 
and CMO later. 
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overcome the enormous political resistance, which you must have gathered from what Chris was 
describing, because lots of people hated it bitterly and went on hating it even well into the time 
when Sally started – 
Sally Davies 
Taking it away.  That is why they hated it. 
Nick Timmins 
You have the regional structure that allows you to do this and then the regions get abolished.  Did 
that have an impact?  Keith, you made the point earlier that it did, but in terms of where we go next 
with this story? 
Sally Davies 
We had a stage before that, where we ran a competition for the Culyer money, though it was all 
pretend money, and all the Trusts had to bid in dreadfully long documents.  We then had a very 
interesting process with all the regional directors there and 53% of the money was in whatever 
region I was doing at the time, North Thames, and the rest was across eight other regions.15  They 
thought this was unfair and wanted to move it.  Then started one of my long-standing phrases, 
which is: if you can show me it will be better spent somewhere else, you may move it.  They could 
not show it would be better spent, so we never moved it, but because I used that everywhere, I was 
then able to use it in NIHR, ‘I can spend it better not with you but over there’, so I was able to move 
it.  However, we did have that exercise and I think £10 million moved. 
Nick Timmins 
That is £10 million out of how much? 
Chris Henshall 
Five hundred million. 
John Pattison 
We were still wrestling with that in a meeting that I had with you and Nigel Crisp; Nigel was 
regional director and you were the regional director of R&D.  At the time, we were only thinking of 
moving something like £10 million out of a budget of £400-and-something million and you were 
very concerned to know that Bart’s and UCH would not be disadvantaged by that.  That process, it 
is quite right, we are all poachers turned gamekeepers, are we not, depending which side of the 
fence we are on.  What was the date that you are talking about finding out from each of your Trusts 
that 53% was in north London?  Was that 1998? 
Sally Davies 
It was as soon as we had done the Culyer declaration. 
                                                 
15 The other seven regions. 
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Chris Henshall 
The Culyer declaration was done and the money was moved, but then the first set of allocations 
within this new budget was a year or two later, because a lot of preparation had to be done, Trusts 
had to be told that they now had to bid.  Sally has put her finger on it; the first attempt – and maybe 
we could have done it better, but you learn as you go – 
Sally Davies 
No, I would never have let you move it. 
Chris Henshall 
No, but what we learned was that there were people who were going to mount very strong, and 
good, arguments, exactly as Sally said: what evidence do you have it will do better somewhere else?  
I had moved on by that point, but what was learned by the system was if you are going to start 
moving serious sums of money like this, you had better have a proper system for doing it.  You had 
better have a system of quality assurance that is robust and fit for purpose and that is what was then 
set up. 
John Pattison 
Meanwhile, people like Keith in Cambridge were saying, ‘We get so little by comparison and yet 
our research effort is comparable in size and in quality’.  We had many conversations about that. 
Keith Peters 
I had moved from the Hammersmith, which had a huge research budget, to Cambridge, which had 
virtually none.  I am talking about in the health service.   
Sally Davies 
I thought it was £4 million. 
Keith Peters 
I am not sure, Sally.  It is very important to consider these things against the economic background 
of the health service.  It is one thing to move money when money is going into the health service; it 
is another thing to move money when the health service, like it is now, is absolutely static and 
facing increasing costs.  Throughout most of the period that we are talking about, of course, the 
health service was under severe pressure. 
Nick Timmins 
At the end of the 1990s, money was very tight. 
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Keith Peters 
It only returned in 1997, 1998 when Gordon Brown loosened his grip on things as more money was 
coming in.16  It is under those circumstances that it was much more practical to – remember, most 
of the money we are talking about was paying salaries and looking at the real cost of looking after 
patients in hospital.  It was not a budget that you could easily move and that is one reason why the 
defence against moving was so powerful: you are asking me to sack people.  In Cambridge, though, 
when eventually money started to be more proportionate to research activity we got a lot more and 
it was wonderful. 
John Pattison 
Keith makes a very good point that R&D is alongside long-term maintenance; that when the going 
gets tough then that tends to suffer.  When I arrived, in 1999, for that reason and a number of 
others, one of which was ‘well, show us what the payback is’, the standing of NHS R&D was going 
down.  If that trend had continued, we would have been in serious trouble over the next four or five 
years.  Fortunately, things turned around. 
Nick Timmins 
That standing in whose eyes?  Ministers’ eyes? 
John Pattison 
Yes. 
Sally Davies 
This is global.  There was quite an interesting move about four years ago by OECD and they 
relabelled R&D funding not as revenue but as investment, as R&D capital.  It is quite interesting 
that it is a global issue, this stealing of R&D money and not recognising the long-term role. 
Chris Henshall 
On what John has said, I then moved to the Department of Trade and Industry and worked on the 
science and innovation budget in general and that dynamic, which Sally harnessed by the time she 
had become a – the health people were beginning to say, ‘Well, this could be spent on replacing 
hips and we have a queue for those, so why are we spending this money?’  That was always there 
and John is right, it was getting stronger, but Gordon Brown, with the white heat of revolution, the 
2004 10-year spending review for science and technology, the future of the country’s economy is in 
pumping money into R&D.  That was influencing a reluctant Minister of Health and so whilst the 
Minister of Health’s excitement may have been dampening after a launch in 1991 and ‘well, what 
have we got for it?’, that was countered by the Gordon Brown Treasury – and David [Cooksey] was 
very much involved in this – push on ‘this is an investment in the future, this is fundamental to our 
economy’.  Various other things happened, including the Cooksey report, which was to try to line 
up the Department’s view of research and development with the national view that this was an 
investment and had a major economic component as well as efficiency and quality for the health 
service.  Bringing those two things together was absolutely key politically. 
                                                 
16 The 1997 government delayed substantial real-terms increases in NHS spending until 2000/01. 
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Paul Atkinson 
By the time we get to the 10-year investment strategy we are talking about 2004. 
John Pattison 
Just to illustrate the situation, Frank Dobson was the secretary of state when I was appointed, but he 
was then persuaded to stand as London mayor, much against his better judgement – as it turned out, 
he was right – and Alan Milburn was appointed.  Shortly after Alan Milburn arrived, 
Simon Stevens came to see me.  He was then special advisor to Alan Milburn and he said to me, 
‘John, you have a long way to go to capture the hearts and minds of ministers’.  We were at a bit of 
a low ebb at that stage. 
Nick Timmins 
I find that very interesting, because my impression was that throughout the 1990s, which we have 
been talking about a lot, as the money was getting tighter and tighter and tighter after a big spending 
increase in 1991, people like Alan Langlands, Ken Calman, Clive Smee were determined to keep a 
quality, evidence-based medicine research agenda going in the face of this as best they could and 
with not a lot of interest from ministers. 
Chris Henshall 
Yes. 
John Pattison 
Yes. 
Nick Timmins 
That was happening and when Labour arrived they did create NICE.  Labour’s political positioning 
ahead of 1997 was just all over the place.  They did not have a policy other than the fact that they 
were interested in evidence-based medicine and what became NICE.  Are you drawing a distinction 
here between a willingness to create NICE, which is an absolute use of cost effectiveness stuff and 
scepticism about returns from the broader R&D programme? 
Chris Henshall 
The incoming Labour government had huge scepticism about the good faith of the civil service.  
There was an enormous suspicion of existing institutions – because they had been working so long 
for the other side they must be suspect – so the Department’s own work on something like NICE 
was left on the shelf.  Simon Stephens’ blueprint for NICE influenced what was created and 
Graham Winyard and people in the healthcare directorate had been working on something similar 
for ages.  It ended up very similar, but that was not what drove NICE, that was Labour’s political 
advisors.  There was a big suspicion, when Labour came in, of the R&D programme, just like there 
was a big suspicion of a lot of things. 
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Michael Rawlins 
It was more complicated than that, Chris.  During the middle to late-1990s, there was the whole 
postcode prescribing of beta interferon; there was the business of the incoming Labour government 
wanting to incorporate elements of cost effectiveness.  In fact, in early 1998, when I was chairman 
of the Committee on Safety of Medicines, Baroness Jay summoned me to her office on my own – 
Keith Jones, who ran the MCA, was horrified that Rawlins was going to see a minister without a 
minder.  Baroness Jay said to me, ‘We are interested in incorporating elements of cost effectiveness 
for new drugs.  Would your committee, having given advice on quality, safety and efficacy, be 
prepared to then consider cost effectiveness, to separate out the decisions?’  I said, ‘I would not 
advise it.  I know committee behaviour.  If you know, in 30 minutes’ time, you have a rotten cost 
effectiveness decision, you will fudge the first one.  You can always find something wrong with the 
quality.  The pharmacists can be guaranteed; the clinical trials, you can always find something 
wrong’ and all the rest of it.  I said, ‘No’ and I am sure I was completely right, but afterwards I 
wrote her a memo, which I have lost; an FOI request could probably dig it out, but I am slightly shy 
of doing an FOI request on my own memo. [1h09’47]  
Nick Timmins 
That is alright, Mike, I will do it for you. [laughter] 
John Pattison 
Your point, Nick, is that an incoming government wants to do all sorts of things.  Money has to be 
found to do those all sorts of things and, as Keith described, in a situation where money is staying 
level, in real terms, at best and diminishing, in real terms, at worst, you have to take money from 
somewhere that exists in order to do something new.  It was not just NICE, I am not getting at 
NICE at all, it was a question of is it going to stay in R&D in DH or is the DTI somehow, with 
David’s help, not that he was on the DTI side, but when industry, which is another stream of the 
changes, was coming along DTI made a strong play for the extra investment to be given to the DTI 
as opposed to the DH in supporting bioscience, which was going to support some of the 
recommendations in your report, David.  You had to re-establish or promote the ability and the trust 
that was based in NHS and DH R&D; otherwise the new money was going to go somewhere else if 
you were not careful. 
David Cooksey 
One of the things that really worried Gordon Brown was the fact that the pharmaceutical industry 
was emigrating its R&D from this country, mainly because the university infrastructure was totally 
insufficient at that time.  I persuaded the Wellcome Trust (I was a governor at the time) to work 
with the government, with the Joint Infrastructure Fund (JIF) programme and Gordon picked that 
up immediately and it made a very substantial difference to his attitude, particularly from the 
feedback he got from that programme.  It was what primed him for what came later. 
Nick Timmins 
Are we now talking about 2000? 
David Cooksey 
No, that was in 1998. 
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Nick Timmins 
Right, so he was interested then.  It seems to me that NICE gets set up and there is a bit of a lacuna 
until we hit 2000 when, suddenly, Tony Blair makes his spending pledge and the taps do not open 
instantly, but they start to open and there is a lot more money around suddenly. 
Sally Davies 
Then you have to look at the predecessor of John, who found the job, I would argue, rather 
difficult.17  I remember we had a board and he told us (the regional directors) that £10 million was 
being taken out of the budget.  At which point, I went off to see Ron Oxburgh and said, ‘What do I 
do about this?’ and he said, ‘I am going to introduce you to Bob May, who is the Chief Scientific 
Advisor’.  When I told him the story, he said, ‘I will sort that’.  At the next board I went to, John’s 
predecessor said, ‘Someone has leaked it and they are for the sack if they find out’ and I sat there, 
smiled sweetly and said, ‘I would be fascinated to know who leaked it’.  He did not battle for it, 
though, and if people do not battle for things they are not valued.   
Keith Peters 
There is one other bit of mood music that is worth saying.   Now it seems so obvious, but the 
mindset in the 1990s, as I perceived it, at the centre of government and Treasury and so on, was that 
the NHS and medicine was a black hole into which you poured money, which was spent in ways 
that many people thought was unaccountable and unproductive, etc.  The best thing for the country 
to do was to limit, as it were, the ‘waste’ of money on healthcare and keep the money that you had 
left over for education, research, industry, etc.  The idea that the healthcare system was part of a 
wealth-generating system was really quite alien then.  It is not alien now and I am not sure, looking 
back, when that transition occurred. 
Sally Davies 
Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT), then Cooksey’s report.18 
Keith Peters 
David’s report helped, but reports always reflect the attitudes of the people who are in them.  
Somewhere around 2000, there was a starting to realise that the healthcare system was an asset. 
The other thing is, which David referred to, it was already clear that the NHS had an important 
relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, often fraught, but in fact the pharmaceutical industry 
was retreating from the UK and has continued to do so.  However, it might have retreated a damn 
sight faster if some of the things that David did through BIGT, etc, had not happened. 
Nick Timmins 
I would endorse a bit of that, because there was a hell of a lot of right-wing hostility to the whole 
idea of the NHS from the mid-1990s onwards. 
                                                 
17 Professor John Swales. 
18 Biosciences Innovation and Growth Team, Bioscience 2015: Improving National Health, Increasing 
National Wealth (London: Bioindustry Association, DH, DTI, 2003).  
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Louise Wood 
I was just about to pick up on that point.  In 1999, the then PM met with the chief execs of 
AstraZeneca, Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham and that led to the establishment of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF).  That was the first time that there 
was a strategic relationship between government and the pharmaceutical industry and it was not just 
between the Department of Health and the industry, it also involved Treasury, No 10, the Business 
Department and the Education Department.  That signalled a big change that followed a whole 
series of reports. 
Nick Timmins 
That is a great point at which to break and we will jump off from there in the next session. 
 
Emergence of the Present NHS Research System 
Nick Timmins 
We have reached the stage where we need to do two things one after the other, but slightly in 
parallel.  We have reached the PICTF and all that bit and, over tea, Sally said to me that what John 
was up to immediately after this period (2000-2006) was really important as part of laying the 
ground for NIHR, so do you want to start with that?19 [1h38’36] 
John Pattison 
We have already begun to identify some of the general themes that, to my mind, happily, all took us 
in the same direction towards, ultimately, NIHR.  We reversed the standing of NHS DH R&D in the 
view of ministers, including, importantly, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
There was a time when it seemed clear that much of the policies had moved across Whitehall to No 
10 and 11 rather than on the fourth floor of Richmond House.20 
Secondly, Sally and Chris, we established that NHS R&D could be helpful and deliver and that is 
always important.  The best example was prostate cancer, probably.  It was an embarrassment, at 
the time.  It was and still is one of the major causes of morbidity and mortality in men and NHS 
R&D was spending the princely total of £90,000 per annum on it.  Ministers recognised that there 
was public clamour and also recognised, on numerous occasions, that when you do not know what 
to do about an issue, to sponsor an R&D programme is about as good a response as you can give.  
They did that and we helped them with it, I think successfully, though we still do not have a number 
of the answers to key questions. 
Thirdly, there was the reorganisation of the Department of Health and the administration of the 
National Health Service with the disappearance of the regions, etc, which seemed, to me, to lay the 
ground for the centralisation of much of the decision making and the potential to run NHS R&D 
from the centre as opposed to the very distributed system with regional directors, 10,000 projects, 
                                                 
19 John Pattison’s term as Director of NHS R&D was 2000-2004. 
20 Richmond House, Whitehall, was the headquarters of the Department of Health. 
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13 R&D units, the major programmes of HTA, the Cochrane Collaboration, SDO, which I found 
when I first got there, in 1999.   
The other stream, which David can talk much more insightfully about, is the whole business of the 
espousal of the fact that a science-based and particularly a bioscience-based economy is probably 
one of our best bets for the future as a country.  The relationship between Sir David and 
Gordon Brown was absolutely key in taking things forward in that respect. 
Nick Timmins 
Right.  The greater Prime Ministerial and Chancellor interest in this presumably came with the big 
announcement of the money.  Once Blair has said, ‘We are going to get it up to European spending 
levels’ and Gordon has said, ‘You have stolen my fucking budget’, but came up with the cash, it 
was clear that there was a very central interest in getting something back from all this, yes? 
John Pattison 
I have to say that, sitting in the Department, I was absolutely astonished at that settlement, 
completely surprised.  It just felt as if Gordon Brown was saying to the NHS and to the Department 
of Health and its relationship with the NHS, ‘I have taken care of the money, now you show us 
what you can do’.   
Sally Davies 
Before we go to David, you have forgotten some bits, John, which you played a role in.  We moved 
from petty baronies of the R&D directors – I am a petty baron, reformed, of course – into a much 
more centralised system.  You set up the Cancer Research Network, which delivered.  You set up 
the Experimental Medicine for Cancer Network and then you chaired the Research for Patient 
Benefit Working Party.  All of those were key foundational things that you did that delivered.  
There are probably more, I just cannot remember them. 
John Pattison 
We were given tasks, we worked at them and delivered something useful.  That did our standing 
quite a lot of good and it achieved things.  PICTF is an interesting one.  Philip Hunt was put in 
charge of it as the minister.  It worked.  There was a certain amount of tension to start with, but by 
the end there was quite good relationships between all the parties who were gathered around the 
table.  Interestingly, though, I am not sure what it achieved in concrete terms, except that it showed 
the pharmaceutical industry that the government was prepared to collaborate with the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Whether anything concrete came out of it I have no idea.  I was always 
suspicious that something was agreed behind closed doors that we did not ever talk about in open 
committee, but there we are. 
Keith Peters 
There is one other thing to say about you, John.  When you took the job, you had been dean of a 
very large medical school and you understood the breadth and complexity of medical research in a 
way that neither of your predecessors had done.  You brought a different sort of credibility to the 
table and that is worth recording as well. 
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John Pattison 
Thank you.  You are embarrassing me. 
Chris Henshall 
To pick up John’s point about PICTF, obviously I agree with the previous point.  I had been in the 
Department of Health for nearly 10 years when PICTF was set up and what had changed was the 
Blair kind of centralised government, government from No 10, saying to the Department of Health, 
in very clear terms that it had never heard before, ‘You are part of a government that has a bigger 
agenda and you need to be part of that agenda’.  For most of my 10 years in the Department of 
Health up to that point, frankly, a lot of people saw industry as the problem.  Here it was producing 
all this expensive stuff that we could not afford and the solution to this problem was health 
technology assessment to keep it out.  That is obviously a ridiculous oversimplification, but the idea 
that industry was a key part of the national economy and that we had to find a way of working 
together was kickstarted by PICTF.  The fact was that the two departments of state were made to 
work together and Blair and Brown basically said, ‘You will sort this problem’.  By the time I left 
the Department, a year later, there had been a real change in attitude across the Department and 
perhaps, to some extent, in the NHS, perhaps less so, to the idea that industry was a key part of the 
national strategy. 
Nick Timmins 
When you say the ‘two departments’ do you mean Health and DTI? 
Chris Henshall 
Yes.  That was my take on the culture. 
David Cooksey 
That certainly feeds into what I would say.  I came to this as being the founder of the first true 
venture capital firm in the UK and even before Blair and Brown came to power they were both in 
touch with me about trying to improve the success rate of technology innovation in this country and 
its commercialisation.  That is how I came into this.  I mentioned earlier the JIF programme, but 
that had followed the establishment of seed venture capital funds on all the university campuses, 
which I did with Gordon in his first budget and he came back to me in the second budget and asked 
for ideas, which ended up with JIF.   
What was interesting to me then, just moving forward a couple of years, was the setting up of the 
BIGT, which produced this report in 2003, Bioscience 2015, which was trying to pave the way 
forward.21   
It drew a lot of attention to the lack of collaboration between the health service and the 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly the biotech industry. I foresaw that if there were good 
collaboration, you could get drugs to market much more quickly. 
The BIGT used the 1.5% research budget number. We were in a spending review period which 
ended in 2006 but we were in 2003 and the budget had dropped from an objective of 1.5% to 0.9% 
                                                 
21 Biosciences Innovation and Growth Team, Bioscience 2015: Improving National Health, Increasing 
National Wealth. 
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and by 2006 the allocation was due to drop to 0.52%. When we dug deeper into the numbers it was 
clear that 80% of the research budget was being spent on service delivery – in other words, 
operational research and so on – and only 20% of it was being spent on clinical research. That was 
the trigger that got Gordon Brown interested. 
An interesting item to note about this report was that it had two editions, one with an introduction 
by Tony Blair and one with an introduction by Gordon Brown. It was the first time that I witnessed 
the fight between them but the fact that they were fighting over the credit for writing the 
introduction meant that they were both engaged and wanted to make it happen. The BIGT report 
was jointly sponsored by the DTI, the Department of Health and the BioIndustry Association. 
When, as far as Gordon was concerned, there was not a fast enough response, he ring-fenced the 
budget for health research and paved the way for NIHR. I think Sally will agree. He then came back 
to me within a year and said, ‘I want a much more fundamental review of funding for the whole 
health research function’.. 
Nick Timmins 
Can you date those two events?   
David Cooksey 
This was 2003. 
Nick Timmins 
Therefore, he came back to you in 2004. 
David Cooksey 
No, he came back in 2005 and my Review was published in 2006. I strayed way outside my brief in 
that review proposing a change to the approach to licensing to what I called ‘conditional licensing’ 
but is now called ‘adaptive licensing’. The whole objective of the report was to engage the 
pharmaceutical industry much more and to have a responsive National Health Service for delivering 
clinical research, clinical trials and so on. Sally should speak about this because she made sure that 
we got the Clinical Trials Networks going as soon as possible after that. 
Nick Timmins 
I was quite intrigued by your comment about what PICTF really did apart from change the climate.  
I remember trying to find out what PICTF was up to and never could, in terms of what it had done, 
other than people were talking about each other in much warmer terms than they had been in the 
past. 
Chris Henshall 
I do not think you would have had initiatives on information on the trials networks and things.  A 
number of things happened in response to PICTF that would not have happened if people had not 
been shaken and told to go in a room and come out with some solutions. 
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John Pattison 
In a sense, the Research for Patient Benefit Working Party came out of PICTF.  Ministers wanted 
something to follow on from that, putting it crudely, in helping the pharmaceutical industry stay in 
the UK.  We could not have a working party called ‘Helping the Pharmaceutical Industry Stay in 
the UK’, so we called it Research for Patient Benefit Working Party. 
David Cooksey 
One thing that may not have come directly from PICTF but certainly came from that initiative was 
the Patent Box, which was definitely part of keeping the industry in the UK.22 
Keith Peters 
That was much later, was it not, David? 
David Cooksey 
Yes, it was much later. 
Kieran Walshe 
I just wanted to sound a slightly more sceptical note about PICTF.  What did the NHS get out of 
PICTF?  As I listened to the discussion, did you get into the discussion with the pharmaceutical 
companies about how they spent the £4 billion a year or so that they spent on research, and how that 
fitted with the needs of the NHS? [1h53’40] 
John Pattison 
No. 
Kieran Walshe 
Was that a missed opportunity? 
Chris Henshall 
PICTF was a bit of a one-way street.  The agenda was the country needs the industry, the industry is 
telling us it is a nightmare dealing with the NHS, please sort that.  That was basically the agenda 
and that is what people discussed.  It led to a number of initiatives and the patient benefit side of it, 
which John has, quite rightly, picked up was where the win-win was.  When we said, ‘Okay, what 
are we now going to do about implementing this?’ the idea that cancer networks would not just 
facilitate the setting up of industry trials but would work for patients to get faster access to 
treatment and things, came in the implementation.  The agenda for PICTF was very much No 10 
and No 11 telling the health service to start getting real about being friendly within their remit, as it 
were, to an industry that was finding them pretty unfriendly.   
                                                 
22 The Patent Box enables a company to apply a lower rate of Corporation Tax to profits earned after 1 
April 2013 from its patented inventions. 
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Louise Wood 
One of the legacies of PICTF was that there was a Clinical Research Working Group, which 
continued to meet after PICTF, which Sally and Vincent Lawton chaired.  There were a number of 
practical things that came out of that, which included a partnership agreement with the NHS that 
articulated essentially the principles to which the parties could hold each other together.  There was 
also the model Clinical Trials Agreement, which was aimed at speeding up the initiation of trials 
and saving the NHS the cost of legal reviews of individual trials contracts.  PICTF, as a whole, 
produced competitiveness indicators, which were published year after year afterwards.  It is the first 
time there are public metrics where people could track progress, including of clinical trial numbers, 
which had a nadir and then increased.   
Kay Pattison 
Chris is right to say that at the same time there was an expansion in budget.  We went from a 
£10 million HTA budget to a £40 million HTA budget or more.  All the things Louise has just 
described in terms of getting research into the NHS quickly and therefore getting results more 
quickly were impactful across all of our budgets, so the fact that we were spending more on 
patient-driven research as well; we have not covered that very much.  We involved patients and 
prioritised research programmes across the NIHR, including through the HTA programme, for all 
programmes.  That research, too, was happening more quickly because of the reforms that came 
through PICTF. 
John Pattison 
What we are doing is emphasising that it was the start of something that subsequently delivered 
quite a bit.  One thing that I really felt personally a complete failure in was to take forward to an 
appropriate point the whole difficulty around research ethics committees.  Subsequently, that has all 
been sorted out. 
Sally Davies 
It started under you.  We did sort it fully, but it started under you.  You laid the foundations for a lot 
more than you are taking credit for. 
John Pattison 
Is this early dementia do you think? [1h57’10] 
Sally Davies 
No, it is your gentle nature. 
Keith Peters 
Just to get all the praise for John out of the way, there is one other thing.  I can recall that on the 
Research for Patient Benefit Working Party we were very conscious of the success of the 
Cancer Network and you said to me, ‘I think we might be able to do this for maybe one or two more 
subjects, what do you think?’ and I think I said something about stroke and so on.  Then you went 
ahead and created a much more full on system of networks, about a dozen, which altered the whole 
dynamic of clinical research.  It means there is not just a few fancy doctors in a specialist unit doing 
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research but making the whole system research conscious.  That came from that particular Working 
Party and you were in charge of it at the time and drove it. 
Nick Timmins 
In this period of 2000-2005, there are a couple of Academy of Medical Sciences reports.23  Did they 
play a significant part? 
Sally Davies 
John Savill’s on clinical scientists was important and Sir John [Pattison] responded.  
Mark Walport’s, which came later, on the failures of academic training and the need to put that 
right was also useful, but that would have been irrelevant if it had not been for David’s 2006 report, 
which gave me £56 million, transferred from the NHS and NIHR set it up and everything.  Mark 
wrote the report, but my team in NIHR and another, contracted out, centre in Leeds delivered that 
with the money that David delivered. 
Keith Peters 
I was president of the Academy in 2002-2006 and, as you know, the Academy was set up in 1998 
with Peter Lachmann as the first president.  The Academy’s mission was to address, if you like, the 
crevasse between, on the one hand, the very powerful base of biomedical science in this country and 
everything else, which formerly had been the responsibility of the royal colleges but they were not 
delivering on. [1h59’50] The translational gap, which is what all this is about, was the Academy’s 
prime mission and the Academy, of course, had strong representation from industry and does to this 
very day, and so the industrial plank was one element of it.   
The other thing that had bothered people from the mid-1980s onwards, but particularly with the loss 
of regions, which were sponsoring the careers, through local funds, of clinical research workers, not 
just medics but the variety, that disappeared with the regions and there was deep concern about the 
lack of clinical research workers.  John Savill did the first report on that and it was followed by 
Mark putting the flesh on it, as you say, and then of course John Bell’s Strengthening Clinical 
Research was the immediate predecessor of your Working Party on Research for Patient Benefit.24  
That covered more than just research training; it is a pretty accurate analysis of the major problems 
that existed around about 2002, 2003 and 2004.  Then the Academy was extremely involved with 
you, David, in your review in 2006.  We spent hours on it and, in fact, the Royal Society was 
involved as well, but of course the Royal Society had played virtually no part in the discussions and 
deliberations about the problems of medical research in the context that we are discussing it.  There 
were hardly any fellows of the Royal Society who were interested in it.  I remember going to one 
meeting and trying to raise it and it disappeared, a bit like Czechoslovakia, a far off country, they do 
things differently there.  The Academy played a pretty vital part in the culture out of which these 
things grew and certainly the dialogue with you, David, was very powerful. [2h01’56] 
Nick Timmins 
Colin Blakemore, what did this look like from the MRC at this point? 
                                                 
23 Clinical academic medicine in jeopardy: recommendations for change (Academy of Medical Sciences, 
London: 2002); Strengthening Clinical Research (Academy of Medical Sciences, London: 2003). 
24 Strengthening Clinical Research (Academy of Medical Sciences, London: 2003). 
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Colin Blakemore 
I would pick up particularly on one of the points that David has made and which has been 
emphasised and that is the importance of the pharmaceutical industry in the whole of the thinking 
then, not just the contribution to GDP but also the contribution of private funding of research in this 
country.  It was by far the biggest element of corporate funding of R&D and the government wanted 
to use that as an example to set to the rest of industry because of under-investment in research.   
I have the impression that by about 2005/6 the government, while it had formed its views about the 
importance of increased emphasis on research in the NHS, had a rather limited perspective of what 
that might achieve and how the money would be used, particularly focusing on clinical trials.  
Certainly the people I spoke to in government imagined that the improvement of the organisation of 
R&D funding in the NHS – maybe better liaison with MRC, more emphasis in MRC on translation 
research and so on – would purely be aimed at delivering clinical trials within the particular, special 
and potentially very positive environment of the NHS for organising trials.  To my mind – and I am 
sure others will have different views – this was somewhat naïve in its expectation that that would 
lead to massive repatriation of trial investment in this country, which had gradually slipped overseas 
to eastern Europe and then, increasingly, to India and to China and so on.  In fact, that has not been 
the pattern.  That is not to say that the investment in R&D in the NHS has not been well spent and 
very important, but I do not think it has quite delivered in the way that perhaps Gordon Brown 
would have expected it in 2004/2005, do you think, David? 
David Cooksey 
I agree with that.  There was optimism amongst ministers.  You have to look at politicians’ attitude 
towards the health service.  There are votes to be lost by doing it badly and as long as they can tell a 
good story they expect to gain votes from it.  The trouble with the health service is you have to take 
a 20-year view of what is going to happen and the longest horizon any politician has is the next 
election, which is a maximum of five years.  That is our main problem.   
Colin Blakemore 
It is a good thing that the public, when it comes to the NHS, has a longer term perspective.  That 
certainly exercises some influence on governments even with the limited time horizon that 
governments always have. 
Can I just go back to the question that you really asked, which is about the MRC?  When I joined 
the MRC, in 2003, of course this was the stirrings and the beginnings of all the discussion we have 
heard about in the last half-hour.  There was an element of fear and concern that the contribution 
that the MRC had made traditionally in developing areas of research, which was certainly relevant 
to clinical issues – the biggest funder of clinical trials, for example, the establishment of the 
Clinical Trials Unit and so on – was not going to be adequately recognised.  With the buoyancy of 
the feeling about the importance of developing research within the NHS, that the MRC’s 
contribution and, indeed, its future might slip off the horizon a bit, we felt a bit beleaguered at 
times.  Personally, I was very keen that we should emphasise not only what we had done in the past 
but also what we planned to do in the future, with the emphasis on translation.  There was some 
resistance to that in the biomedical research community amongst basic researchers, who felt that 
they were threatened by that slight change of emphasis within the MRC.  Tactically, politically and 
realistically it was absolutely the right thing to do and set the scene for the willingness of MRC to 
work in this very significant development that was to follow in the next four years. 
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David Cooksey 
Can I just say that Colin kept my feet to the fire in a big way during this time.  Every time I met him 
to discuss my pending report there would be an article about how wicked I was in 
Research Fortnight.25  In truth, what made a difference was the fact that I got away with persuading 
government to not only increase funding for clinical research very considerably but to parallel it 
with quite an increase in the MRC’s resources as well.  Colin forgave me from that moment 
onwards. 
Iain Chalmers 
Very briefly, of the various Academy reports that have been referred to already I do not rate any of 
them as important as the one on reducing hyper-regulation in research, which was chaired by my 
neighbour here.26  I thought it was very important.  Taken together with Janet Wisely’s appointment 
as chief executive of the Health Research Authority, those have been extremely important.  It is just 
tragic that, through ill health, she has had to stand down, because she was exceptionally good at 
taking some of your suggestions and reflecting them in the arrangements for assessing research. 
Brian Edwards 
Can I come to new drugs?  A lot of the political and managerial focus was on new drugs coming 
onto the market through clinical trials, then coming to the end of the clinical trial and then 
somebody had to pay for it.  I remember trying to get the centre to offer some advice on new drugs, 
but it was difficult.  It may have been mixed up with the work that was going on collaborating with 
the industry, but in two regions that I know of we set our own review up of new drugs, chaired by 
clinicians.  I can recall a series of dinners with Eli Lilly, SmithKline Beecham where they offered to 
let our regional people into their research workshops and to see the results of all their clinical trials 
in order to persuade us that maybe we should provide some cash for new drugs coming onto the 
market.  I do remember the telephone call that said, ‘This is not helpful, Brian, please back off’, so 
we did. 
Nick Timmins 
Telephone call from…? 
Brian Edwards 
Somewhere in the Department of Health, I cannot remember, but it will be one of our liaison 
officers. 
David Cooksey 
You are looking straight at me, Brian.  It was not me. 
Nick Timmins 
This is all pre-NICE presumably.  This is the 1990s, 1980s? 
                                                 
25 A reminder of how controversial the proposals for change were, and how much anxiety they provoked at 
the MRC, until the Government’s preferred solution emerged. 
26 Michael Rawlins (chair), ‘A new pathway for the regulation and governance of health research’, 2011. 
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Brian Edwards 
1990s.  There are two final things to add.  One is the regional general managers were nervous about 
the centralisation of funding and some fought against it, but at the end we were persuaded that this 
was a way to sort it out and create some benefit for all of us.  I know that, because I was chairman 
of the Regional General Managers Group and I was asked the question.  We did, after some early 
fighting, agree to back the centralisation. 
The final comment is, limping alongside all of this high science was clinical audit.  It started just 
after Ken Clarke’s reforms and had mixed success, but there were thousands of clinicians engaged 
in this and, as far as I know, very little research alignment, which was a pity.   
Nick Timmins 
Right.  We should now get into NIHR and its creation.  Who do I start with? 
 
The Creation of NIHR 
Sally Davies 
I was appointed to follow John in 2004.  At one of my early meetings of the Department of Health 
executive board, I was asked to discuss research and I had a slide, which went along the lines of 
‘Why should government invest in research in the NHS?’. [2h11’01] By the time we had had a very 
robust discussion, the chief exec who had appointed me, perm sec, he did both roles, Nigel Crisp, 
had been my director in London, so I knew him well, he had got the whole of the executive 
committee to agree that I should come back in some months with a radical overhaul to look at how 
we could use our investment better.  Then we started on a programme of thinking, debate, 
consultation to come up with a proposal and it would not have happened without Russell Hamilton.  
A variety of people played key roles, but I would argue that Jonathan Grant and the organisation he 
worked with, RAND Europe, played key roles.   
We started by looking at what were the barriers to doing clinical research and it was my view, 
which many seemed to share, that we had lost the art.  It had changed from what it had been when 
we had been leaders to a platform activity and you needed teams.  You needed to have 
methodologists, you needed the clinicians and our clinical research networks were showing you 
needed the support from the networks to deliver it.  Over a period of about a year, we ran 
consultations, discussions, roundtables, teased out the issues, the barriers, thought about how we 
might address it.  There were things like I went to listen to Richard Sykes in Portcullis House and 
he made the argument in his talk that if government was proud of teaching hospitals it ought to fund 
them.27  I walked back to the Department and said, ‘Right, we are going to have biomedical 
research centres.  We will fund them competitively to do experimental medicine’.  Thus, it came 
from all sorts of places and we worked things out. 
Key in working out what we wanted to do was I invited in McKinsey, Nico Henke and his young 
Turks, to challenge, which turned out to be a really good move, because they were doing so much 
                                                 
27 Sir Richard Sykes, Chairman of Glaxo plc: 1997-2000; of Glaxo Wellcome, and of GlaxoSmithKline 
2000-02. Rector of Imperial College 2001-08. 
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for the Department on other areas of health reform and everything that they could fill in bits that, 
although I was in the Department with the team, we did not know were going on.   
The other thing I did was persuade some people from the Treasury to come and critique.  Two 
important things came out of that meeting apart from some really good advice.  One was the 
agreement that we needed our own research budget for market failure research.  The team called me 
the ‘DG for market failure research’ for ages.  It was research we needed that no one else would 
fund and so we got that commitment from the Treasury.  It built a very good relationship with 
someone it turns out had his hands on the money, but entertainingly, after the first one I was told, 
‘You are not supposed to talk to the Treasury.  You can only do that through Finance’.  Of course, it 
was too late.  I had set up a series of meetings and they were with us on it.   
We got to a model, which we called NIHR.  We went out for consultation in August 2015.  It was 
seen as too medical and we did not mean it to be medical.  So much was iterative of our central 
team, was it Russell, was it me, was it Louise, was it Marc, of this concept of we have a health 
system so you can overlay and interdigitate a health research system?  It had the dartboard in it.28  It 
had the four main areas of faculty, infrastructure, market failure research and systems, with the 
patient at the middle, because we do it for the patient, but recognising the important role of 
universities and their academic leadership.  The networks were then how we support the research of 
ourselves, of pharma, of other partners, charities, but recognise the role of people who put patients 
into studies, and then the research funding for SDO [Service Delivery and Organisation], HTA, all 
of that.   
We put a lot of metrics in.  We had the right politician.  I had support from Nigel Crisp, but it was 
Patricia Hewitt – funnily enough, my husband was talking to her yesterday – who was minister.29  
That could not have been better.  She had been Minister for Science and Minister for Women.  
When I went to see her, she said, ‘Of course you have to do this.  I will support you, you are going 
to,’ and she said, ‘It should not be your strategy, it should be government’s’.  I now know the proper 
terms, but she essentially took it through Cabinet and got Cabinet support, which I had not known 
to get, but it gave us a lot of force for when we started moving money.   
We started on 1 April 2006 and, on that day, our website was a .ac website and had taken four 
attempts to get JANET to agree and every time the team said, ‘They have turned it down’, I said, 
‘Go back’.30  We can debate why it is a virtual institute still managed out of the Department of 
Health and this is all about politics with a small ‘p’ and control and things and it is carefully 
thought through on a regular basis.  On that day, on our website all the programmes were laid out, 
thanks to Russell and the team, Marc did his bit, Louise, everyone; what we were going to do, how 
we were going to run it.  The HTA centre in Southampton played a massive role in writing all theirs 
down, the milestones, the metrics we would use, the timetable.  What a wonderful team. We 
dropped a week every so often and then caught it back up.  It was all totally transparent and 
metrics-driven, so no surprises that government gave us more money. 
Nick Timmins 
Which makes it all sound very smooth. 
                                                 
28 The ‘dartboard’, which Davies goes on to describe, was a graphic of NIHR’s activities and stakeholders. 
A recent version can be seen on the NIHR website here.   
29 Patricia Hewitt was Secretary of State for Health, May 2005 – June 2007. 
30 JANET is the Joint Academic Network, the high-speed network for UK research and education, 
responsible among other things for allocating internet domain names to academic bodies. 
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Sally Davies 
Do you want to see the scars on my back? 
Nick Timmins 
Tell us about them. 
Sally Davies 
Well, the hospitals did not like it.  Back to what we were talking about earlier, when the 
Hammersmith came and said, ‘You cannot take £56 million away’.  With the NHS finance director 
beside me, I said, ‘That is interesting, because I can remember coming to you three years ago and 
saying you were not spending it on research and you insisted’.  ‘Yes, but you know it was a game.’  
I said, ‘Tell that to the judiciary when they do you for signing off accounts that you knew were 
wrong.  Off to jail or give me the money’.  That was one example. 
Keith Peters 
Where did you say the scars were, Sally? [laughter] 
Sally Davies 
Ah, let me tell a story about Keith.  I really love him for this one, though he may not sit by me at 
dinner tonight by the time I have told it.  About eighteen  months in, we had a big meeting at the 
QE2 [conference] centre.  Do you remember, Keith, coming to me and saying, ‘You know we all 
thought you were wrong?’  ‘Yes, Keith.’  ‘You know we all thought you could not do it.’  ‘Yes, 
Keith.’  ‘You know we all thought you were going too fast.’  ‘Yes, Keith.’  ‘Well, we were wrong 
and you were right.’  I loved you for that, because you had given me shit.   
Keith Peters 
Not at all, I supported you at all times that you will never know about. 
Sally Davies 
We set up an advisory committee and I remember three very senior members of the biomedical 
community sitting there, saying, ‘You do not know how to do peer review.  If you get the money, it 
should be given to the MRC’.   
Nick Timmins 
To which Colin would have said, ‘Thank you’. 
Sally Davies 
He was one of them.  It is all right, we get on well.  We got to an endpoint where everyone could 
see we were doing a good job. 
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Nick Timmins 
Just list the assorted vested interests that had to be taken and all squared off. 
Sally Davies 
The hospitals, because they were losing money, though my other robust comment was, ‘If you are 
as good as you say you are, you will not lose the money, will you?’, particularly as the money 
increased. 31 
Nick Timmins 
That is a really important point, because what lay behind this was if you have this amount of 
money, you are going to have to bid for it competitively, but if you are good you will get it and, if 
you do not, someone else will. 
Sally Davies 
Yes, that was my line. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes.  Carry on, keep listing. 
Sally Davies 
Many of the clinical triallists found it odd that our HTA programme was commissioned and as we 
upped the budget from £40 million to over £100 million, we still kept over half of it commissioned 
to solve problems.  They did not like that; that we said we would decide the issues.   
Putting in place the academic training programme – thank you again, David, for the £56 million – 
has proved difficult and, in fact, I hear regular gripes that medical schools and Trusts find it 
difficult. 
The biomedical research centres; we were practising social engineering. There was a standoff in 
general between medical schools and hospitals.  They were not working together and we said they 
had to be joint applications, they had to be joint vision, single management.  Many of them did not 
get that the first time around.  They did by the second time. 
The fact that for the first few years academics did not value the money.  Russell changed that.  He 
clocked we needed HEFCE to value the money, so he went and got HEFCE to put it into their 
system to value it and that changed it.32 
Women in science.  On the second biomedical research centre competition, when the panel asked 
the people they were interviewing, ‘What are you doing for women in science?’ I was embarrassed 
in front of our international colleagues by the medical schools’ responses.  Ten days later, I sent a 
letter to deans, chief execs, vice chancellors, you name it, saying we would be unlikely to shortlist 
                                                 
31 Part of the motivation for establishing Biomedical Research Centres was to manage the reactions of the 
existing major players in clinical research, and  their concern about the possibility of losing resources. 
32 This refers to recognition of clinical academics’ work in the Research Assessment Exercise (since 2014, 
the Research Excellence Framework). 
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them if they did not have Athena SWAN Silver Awards five years later.  One letter I received, from 
the then head of Universities UK, who was medical, was so rude we sent back a letter from my 
office saying that I had seen it and asked for it to be filed.33  Another vice chancellor rang me up 
and, after shouting at me, said, ‘Well, it will be one-legged black Jews next, will it not?’  It was 
abusive and racist, it was unpleasant.  They have all come in line and are doing better.  I think they 
need another shake, but they are doing better. 
Can you think of some more?  Come on, Marc, Kay and Louise, you must have had some of them.  
It was a battle. 
Kay Pattison 
There were individual vested interests from particular topic areas.  I can remember one was the 
forensic mental health lobby, which had previously had a programme, thought that the forensic 
mental health research agenda would be lost.  We had to explain that it was perfectly possible to 
apply to Research for Patient Benefit programmes.  We have had to launch an assessment 
programme to put suggestions in for topics.  That is just by way of example.  There were other 
lobbies that felt that their research interests might not be pursued as a result. 
Nick Timmins 
Sally, I can remember you saying to me once that you did it under the radar.  Is that right and would 
you like to explain it? 
Sally Davies 
The power players in this field were all male, most of them were rather older and most of them 
thought they were really rather important and I felt that if I challenged them head on it would not 
work. 
Participant 
Softly, softly catchee monkey. 
Sally Davies 
Yes.  I never stood up and said, ‘My budget is bigger than yours’, though it is still – although it is 
not mine now, I have handed it to Chris Whitty – bigger than the Wellcome’s budget.  I never stood 
up and said, ‘Look what we are doing.  We are doing massive change’ or anything.  I just got on 
and did it below the radar.  If we had stood up and talked about it too much, what do you think, 
Nick?  You were there. 
Nick Black 
I was just thinking as you were saying that, at that time, I was on the Medical Schools Council, even 
though I was not a dean of a medical school.  Every year, we had a retreat at Ditchley, where you 
had the 35 or 40 deans of the medical schools sitting around for two days.  There would be a 
research afternoon and Colin or whoever at that time was head of MRC would come, Sally would 
come and it was fascinating, because there were two sides.  There was the side you [Sally] saw, 
                                                 
33 Professor Sir Eric Thomas, University of Bristol, President of Universities UK, 2011-13.  
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which was a silent, passive hostility, but reasonably polite and the chair always said nice things to 
you, but afterwards I would hear them talking over drinks and there was considerable hostility.  
What you were trying to do was rubbished, in the sorts of ways you have just said – it will not 
work, it is the wrong thing, and so on.   
Nick Timmins 
Was that purely intellectual or was it misogynist?  
Nick Black 
It was protecting their interests.  I do not think misogyny came into it. 
Sally Davies 
They do not like change.  I do not think it was sexist. 
Nick Black 
It may partly have been. 
Keith Peters 
Be careful.  Not all medical school heads felt like that.  I can tell you one who did not.  The truth of 
the matter is there were winners and losers in the system. [2h25’28]  Cambridge, for example, was a 
huge winner from this, winning one of the first biomedical research centres, so that was not a 
uniform view. 
Nick Timmins 
That is a post hoc view, though.  You turned out to be a big winner.  Presumably, when this was all 
being proposed there was a risk you might not be a big winner. 
Keith Peters 
Not at all, no.  At the time, it was quite obvious that there was unequal distribution of funds for 
research centres.  You did not have to be a rocket scientist to see that.  I can mention the 
Hammersmith, where there was £60 million a year going in, to an organisation that had about 
one-tenth of that.   
In the middle of the great successes of all this there were some genuine concerns, which are worth 
articulating.  For example, there was a loss of local autonomy.  The combination of the money 
going into the centre, on the one hand, and the loss of the regions, on the other, meant that there 
were a lot of things that you wanted to do and, in the old days, it was a matter of picking up the 
phone and getting something done, now you had to go through a process.  Of course, the places that 
were good at that process or well organised did very well indeed.  Cambridge’s budget came in very 
substantially.  I was not involved then, but it was doubled in no time at all and now it accounts for 
something like 20% of the Trust’s income; it is a vast change.  In the middle of changes like that, it 
is understandable that people should be upset and concerned.  It is not that they are luddites exactly. 
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Marc Taylor 
I would be interested to know how you feel about the way that this process was standing on 
people’s sore toes.  There was a long period in which the people, who were eminent people who 
were used to competing for money according to the opinion of their peers, by a process of 
competitive excellence, were really not at all comfortable with the idea that Sally should be 
bringing in a process that had other dimensions to it, which were asking about the research agenda 
from the point of view of the patient – 
Sally Davies 
The patient, the public, value for money, methodology, yes. 
Marc Taylor 
Exactly.  It felt a bit, to me, like the period very early on when we were bringing together the 
national programmes, when we wanted to build up research in primary care and we advertised 
against the budget and there were, initially, no proposals to speak of that passed muster at all.  You 
just had to go on and on stimulating people to think that this was a respectable area in which to 
bring forward high quality proposals.  That is bound to crash against, as Sally said, the right way to 
allocate money is by doing excellent science that established people think is excellent. 
Keith Peters 
Sally’s process, as I saw it, at a distance, was to lift it up and get international people on board and 
emulate, as best one can when dealing with things like infrastructure, a fair peer reviewed process.  
I do not think people were really too upset by that.  What upset people was that they saw their 
infrastructure being threatened. 
Sally Davies 
Except that, of course, we then got a lot of capital and we were able to put that into hospitals and 
they did very well for a period of time. 
Keith Peters 
That comes back to the point that you were doing this against an increasing budget in the NHS, 
which was absolutely vital. 
Sally Davies 
Well, yes, but key was David Cooksey going into the back of No 10 and No 11 and the Treasury 
support that we had.  In the end, the Treasury more than doubled the budget and even in the last 
spending review gave me, and I handed it Chris Whitty, was it £150 million of overseas 
development assistance as well to spend?  Part of it is because we say what we are going to do, we 
get the metrics and you lot deliver it. 
Nick Black 
Going back to the comment I was making before about the medical school deans. By, say, 2014, 
their attitude to you [Sally] had changed in private as well as in public. It was now full of 
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admiration, not least that you had not only protected the NIHR budget while all other budgets in the 
NHS were being cut over that period, but you had increased it.  It had switched, they had been won 
over and what you had done was admired. 
Brian Edwards 
Can Sally remember which clinical or public health arguments turned out to be the most 
persuasive? 
Sally Davies 
For what, with the government? 
Brian Edwards 
For increased investment in research and development. 
Sally Davies 
Oh yes: that the NHS owed it to the nation to play its role in our scientific excellence, whether it is 
universities and supporting them or industry.  It was those. 
Brian Edwards 
It was not smoking or diabetes or cancer. 
Sally Davies 
No.  We get the money and then we spend it on what it needs to be spent on. 
David Cooksey 
Sally, I remember, when all this was starting, having debates with you over funding health research 
and you being very concerned that we were not producing an answer at that stage.  Are you satisfied 
with the progress that is being made now? 
Sally Davies 
We have upped the amount a lot, but I do not think it is where I would want it, not just in amount 
but in the main – and Nick could talk to this better than me – the academics are very divorced and 
separated from the delivery.  In one sense, we are covered for the academics because the MRC 
funds their hypothesis-driven work, the Michael Marmots or whatever, but what we need is, again, 
for the customer, which is public health and local authorities and social care, a cadre of researchers 
who are embedded there who can do the work we need.  We are slowly growing it; we have a 
National School of Public Health, one in primary care, one in mental health now to try to develop 
that, but it is a long struggle and it is not for want of trying.  I know that the Office for Strategic 
Coordination of Health Research (OSCHR) is having another look at it with a subcommittee. 
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Michael Rawlins 
Can I say three things?  First of all, the capital budget that Sally mentioned a few minutes ago was 
very important.  It allowed us, for example, in Newcastle to build a clinical trials unit, which we 
had never had before and I can remember you came and opened it for us, Sally. 
The second thing to say is, as far as NICE is concerned, the health technology assessment 
programme was absolutely critical and, certainly at one stage, Kent Woods emailed me to tell me 
that NICE was utilising 50% of the HTA capacity in Britain. 
The third thing to say is when David Cooksey was getting ready to produce his report, he came to 
see me and said, ‘Should NICE have its own research budget?’  I did not know he was going to ask 
the question, so I winged the answer and I said, ‘No’.  I said that for three reasons.  One is how 
much?  Fifty percent of the HTA budget, would Sally really give that up?  No, she would not.  
Secondly, we would have had to devise a whole research bureaucracy, which was completely stupid 
because the NIHR had already done all that and were doing it very well.  Thirdly, it would be a 
fixed sum and if we wanted one year a bit more and another year a bit less, we would not be able to 
fiddle around in any way.  I said no to David and I think I was right.  NICE has had very good value 
for money, as it were, from NIHR and will be always very grateful to it. 
Sally Davies 
Tom played a big role in that. 
Michael Rawlins 
Absolutely.  Is he blushing? 
Tom Walley 
It was not my money. 
Kay Pattison 
There is another reason why it is good to have the two budgets separate and that is that it seems 
independent of the NICE decision-making process.  When you go on Radio 4, you can say, ‘We did 
not do that research’.  That independence is really important. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes.  Colin, given that the MRC had reservations about what Sally was up to when she was up to it, 
if you see what I mean, before it was completed, did the MRC get reconciled and, if so, how long 
did that take? 
Colin Blakemore 
I would question the assumption that the MRC was opposed to it.   
Nick Timmins 
I did not say ‘opposed’, I said ‘concerned’. 
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Colin Blakemore 
We were concerned about our own future, the survival of the MRC and our ability to go on doing 
what we thought we did well, not to the increase of investment in research in a clinical 
environment.  A lot of the discussion of the last 10 minutes goes over my head, because I am not a 
clinician and therefore did not see the effects in clinical environments.  I only later began to see the 
enormously positive impact of NIHR funding and the skill with which NIHR, but also senior 
clinicians themselves, had worked the system to make it effective in their favour.  If you go into 
medical research centres and see the leaders and ask where their funds are coming from, the core of 
support in the clinical environment of course comes from NIHR far more often than anywhere else.  
You see that that focus has acted as a magnet in attracting other major funding – BHF [British Heart 
Foundation], Cancer Research UK, MRC, Wellcome and so on – coalescing the core support from 
NIHR and so that is an excellent thing.   
Just reflecting on some of the points that have been made, the concerns that I saw – and not me 
alone, I assure you – about the emergence of NIHR with its budget was no longer the threat to the 
rest of us, because as far as we and many people in the NHS were concerned, this was essentially 
new money that had been pulled back from service support, it was how it was going to be used 
effectively.  There were concerns in the very early days about peer review.  There was also – and I 
am very happy to admit this – a lack of recognition of the value of commissioned research at the 
delivery end of medical research.  The notion of going and saying, ‘We would like this bit of 
research done and we will find people to do it and ask them to do it’ was anathema to Wellcome 
and to MRC.  It ran against all the principles of investigator-led, quality-driven research proposals 
and all of us could have pointed to depressing failures in earmarked calls for proposals in the past 
that had not delivered, because the capacity to do the work was not there.  What we have all learned 
is that clinical research at the delivery end is different.  You have a problem, there are good people 
around you who can identify it, you can get it solved if the money is there and you draw up the 
commission, effectively. 
The other issue that concerned us – and I would like to think that at the early stages of the 
discussion the advisory group to NIHR in the early stages, for instance, had an impact on this – was 
the balance between NIHR’s investment in the core for high quality clinical research in hospital 
environments and the fraction that would be allocated on a more commissioned basis for specific 
channels with funding for applied research.  The emergence of the biomedical research centres – I 
can remember very well the initial call for the biomedical research centres – was really greeted by 
everybody with an element of surprise, but a feeling that this was a very positive move.  I remember 
very well Sally saying that she had asked John Savill to chair the charabanc that whizzed around the 
country doing the peer review.  That set the seal on the process of harmonising the relationship with 
MRC, because John was, at that time, chair of the clinical sciences board at the MRC.  It really set 
the seal on the effort to develop a good working relationship. 
Nick Timmins 
Almost as an aside, I would be interested to know if people shared the view that you can 
commission applied research, service-driven research, but it is difficult to commission more basic, 
blue sky research.  You have to rely on people having the ideas rather than you saying, ‘We need 
this problem solved’. 
Sally Davies 
Then it is mission-driven.  If it is fundamental research, it is mission-driven research that you are 
commissioning. 
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Marc Taylor 
I want to remind everybody about a very interesting working example.  Do you remember that 
preposterous manifesto commitment to have genetics knowledge parks? 
Sally Davies 
Oh, indeed. 
Marc Taylor  
John led a process that somehow turned that into a series of linked calls, so that you would do 
something around genetics from early science through to the clinical application of it.  I am taking 
the words out of your mouth, John.  I am sure you could say what you thought we made of it, but at 
the beginning it seemed so unpromising. 
John Pattison 
Did it seem so unpromising, Marc?  One thing I have not explicitly stated is that, as director of 
R&D for five years, you had to operate in a system that was governed by politicians who had been 
elected and who had the power to tell you what to do and if you kept saying no, no, no, no, no, no, 
no, no, then you would have to find another job.  I think that is why my predecessor, John Swales, 
had such a difficult time.  There are some impurities in the water and you just have to tolerate them 
otherwise you are going to have a real problem.  They wanted knowledge parks, so we had to 
deliver knowledge parks as part of a big package of seeking resources to try to promote genetics in 
the NHS.  It was not such a bad idea.  They were called knowledge parks for reasons I cannot quite 
remember, but what you were doing really was trying to set up centres of excellence in genetics and 
that is not necessarily a bad thing to do.  I have lost track of what happened to them, Marc.  Did 
they endure? 
Marc Taylor 
For a while they did quite well, but the interesting thing was that we managed to include some calls, 
for example, for people to think about the legal implications of changes in genetic science and 
about how to explain genetics and the possibilities to the public.  This was something that had 
hardly been thought of at the time and was generally an area for fear and anxiety rather than hope 
and imagination. [2h41’31] 
John Pattison 
Part of that came, Mike, from Newcastle, which seemed, to me, to have done that brilliantly with 
your Centre for Life.34  I do not know what particular bit of cloning they were doing in the 
department that day, but I asked John Burn if there was any anxiety in the public about this and he 
said, ‘No, we are open to the public, we engage the public and there is a slightly tribal feeling in 
Newcastle that says, well, if we are doing it here it must be alright then’.35 
                                                 
34 The Centre for Life is a science village incorporating a visitor attraction, educational facility, research 
facilities housing biotechnology companies and an institute of Newcastle University, and two NHS clinics. 
35 Sir John Burn, Professor of Clinical Genetics at Newcastle University. 
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Sally Davies 
It might be worth picking up on something you said about this interrelationship between politics 
and NIHR.  Thanks to Russell, I am expert at Rothschild and separation – Haldane, sorry, you see I 
cannot even remember which now.  Now I am only CMO I forget what I am talking about.  One of 
the things we have managed to shift is that though they still ask for things and we are expecting an 
ask on prostate cancer any day again, they understand that they can say, ‘This has to be a priority in 
some form’.  Our present ministers have understood that if they say, ‘We will ring-fence a budget 
for this’ then they have opened themselves to every single group, so they do not say it, they are 
quite clever, and they have let us get on with it.   
I had lunch last week with the Cabinet Secretary.  I was seeking his advice on something else I am 
doing and he said, ‘Your strength in NIHR was to get them to agree to let you set it up, then to go 
away and do it and not bring the politicians in, and just let them open things and get all the credit 
and congratulations’.  He advised me on this other problem to do exactly the same and I think we 
have managed and that is why it is still safe to leave it there.  We argued it was best as a virtual 
system because one of our values is equity and fairness across the country.  We debated it regularly 
and I am sure the debate goes on should it be separate from DH or should it be sited there.  The 
minute you put it as a sibling of the MRC outside, then it has to compete with the research councils 
for money rather than going on its own and the ministers for the health system have no ownership 
of it.  The ministers overseeing the MRC felt no ownership and therefore they do not fight hard for 
the money, they do not help you; they are passive, it goes through and around them.  The quid that 
we pay the ministers of listening to their needs and trying to help is worth the quo – or whichever 
way around it is – of the support we get for the budget and the fact it exists.  That is why we have 
done it that way. 
Michael Rawlins 
And you do not cause them any trouble. 
Sally Davies 
No, of course I do not. [2h44’47] 
John Pattison 
The other thing to say about them is that they have not got to where they have by being dumb.  They 
are quite intelligent people and I know that it is all politics and it is responsive and what have you, 
but most of it is not a bad way of carrying on, to be honest.  Prostate cancer is still the best example, 
I suspect, Sally. 
Sally Davies 
How much did ProtecT cost us?  £37 million.  Who else has spent that much on one clinical trial 
across the world? 
John Pattison 
Yvette Cooper rang me up one day.  She was Minister for Public Health at the time and she was 
standing in Alan Milburn’s office.  We had been asked how much we spent on prostate cancer and 
it was £90,000 that year and I cannot remember the exact words, but basically she said, ‘John, can 
you find £1 million out of your existing money to put into a prostate cancer programme?’  Things 
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were pretty tight, Sally, at the time, particularly in the regions, which was where we were reducing 
things.  Before I answered, she said, ‘Alan and I will support an application for £5 million per 
annum increase in your funding in the next spending review’.  With those odds, you just say yes and 
you find the money somewhere. 
Iain Chalmers 
I have the impression we are approaching David’s report, but we have not got there and I want to 
say something that is related to that. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes, we are about to get there, so shall we? 
David Armstrong 
Yes, my comments fit in.  Just to follow on from Colin’s earlier observations, can I bring in the role 
of the scientists on the ground, who have not been in the picture so far?  At the time of the Cooksey 
Report and at the time of NIHR’s creation, I chaired the board at MRC that looked after clinical 
trials, the Health Service and Public Health Research Board.  There were five boards, this was the 
fifth board and, as we have heard, it had a rather uneven gestation vis-à-vis the DH and was, in 
many ways, culturally different from the other boards.  The other four boards were basic science 
whereas we were applied science, because we are dealing mainly with thinking about the health 
service and how would our research impact on the health service.  When the news came through 
that NIHR was going to be formed and all the trials were going to be transferred across, there was 
some disappointment across the board, because we were the bit of MRC that was being affected.  
There were two things that stuck in my mind as important.  One was MRC always seemed to be 
high quality research.  It was international, so all the reviewing was international and so on, we had 
to be internationally competitive.  The second thing was MRC had MRC trials.  They had started 
trials and an MRC trial seemed to be an internationally recognised term for good quality trial, and 
we were concerned that both of these were lost.   
These were fairly short-lived concerns, because eventually that community who were on the board 
migrated across into NIHR.  Many of the NIHR members of the programmes or chairs of the 
programmes came from that MRC board.  Many of my colleagues then went into NIHR and even 
myself, I eventually took Sally’s shilling and I too went on to direct an NIHR programme.  It was 
interesting that the scientists themselves simply migrated from one home to another. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes, right. 
Kay Pattison 
There is a point as well about setting the agenda, if I may.  As has been mentioned, we have a 
significant budget now for global health research.  I have not been very involved in that, but I did 
see a list of commissioned research projects and I anticipated that I would not recognise any of the 
names, that these would be new people I had not come across before because I had not come across 
global health research.  In fact, I recognised almost all of them, because what has happened is good 
people who have been involved with NIHR in the past in different areas have migrated towards 
global health research because there is some funding there.  You can move people into those areas 
where you would like to see research commissioned, whatever that might be.  We have been very 
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successful in that and with global health research it proves that you can pull people into different 
areas to follow the money. 
Nick Timmins 
Right, great.  We ought to move to 2006 and your funding health service research report, because 
that changes some of the ways the money flows. 
David Cooksey 
It has had a very positive effect in terms of pulling everything together, but that has depended on 
people like Sally and so on to make it happen rather than the very fact that more money was on the 
table.  That report is now 11 years old and, to me, one of the really big disappointments in 
following it has been the way that during the gestation of the report I had a huge ‘come on’ from the 
pharmaceutical companies for what I was trying to do, but in fact, if you look at what they have 
done since then, it has been to largely remove themselves from discovery research and rely on 
government, charities or universities in one form or another to provide the discovery research.  To 
me, that is a huge disappointment, because one was looking for a parallel effort from the industry to 
move the whole agenda forward.  Look at the way that AstraZeneca now only has 7,500 people 
working in the UK and Pfizer has closed down Sandwich and so on.  Interestingly, Pfizer has 
announced that it is withdrawing entirely from dementia research, which is extraordinary, to my 
mind, if they want to be taken seriously as a pharmaceutical company. 
Nick Timmins 
I hate to be thick, but by ‘discovery research’ you mean…? 
David Cooksey 
I mean basic biomedical research to get to the fundamentals. They are relying increasingly on the 
capabilities that we are providing in biomedical research for everything that we have discussed. One 
of the things I am really concerned about is the pricing of drugs by the pharmaceutical companies 
who are allowed to charge a large margin over cost. This merely encourages them to pump up the 
cost of Phase III trials in order to justify increasing the price of their drugs. Quite frankly, I am 
horrified at what has gone on. 
Sally Davies 
It is interesting you say that – and I know and I agree – but President Clinton was in town this 
weekend speaking at a patient safety conference and he said he thought the pharma model was 
broken.  They could not go on charging these very high prices in rich countries.  
David Cooksey 
Quite frankly, if this report could be slanted in a way that draws attention to the need for that, I 
would be delighted, I really would, because we have to completely review where we stand on the 
patenting of drugs and what protection the drug companies get for that. 
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Michael Rawlins 
About the drug pricing, sometimes it is absolutely awful, but one of the things NICE has managed 
to persuade the pharmaceutical industry to do is to negotiate commercial-in-confidence discounts 
and that has been very important and you do not know what the discounts are.  When I was chairing 
NICE, I was criticised heavily by equivalent organisations overseas, which kept on saying, ‘We do 
not know what you are paying’.  I said, ‘I have to look after the British public, you have to look 
after yours.  What I am doing is looking after British patients’. [2h53’43] 
Nick Black 
May I ask David a question?  You say you have been horrified by subsequent events, but have you 
been surprised? 
David Cooksey 
I was surprised by the commitments that they were prepared to give at that time. Roche undertook 
to Gordon Brown to move approaching 30% of their clinical research capability from Switzerland 
to this country; it never took place. 
Colin Blakemore 
Your point about investment, I think you said ‘inflated payment in phase III clinical trials’ as being 
part of the argument for the overt pricing, how does that work economically?  If they are paying 
more for trials, then is the increase in pricing not directly justified? 
David Cooksey 
It is justified according to the current model, which I am querying.  Secondly, what I am saying is 
that it is not the regulators who are driving up that cost, it is the pharmaceutical companies 
themselves in order to justify higher drug prices.  We do not have a policing mechanism to really 
challenge that situation other than the NICE model, but it comes at it from a different direction. 
Nick Timmins 
Is there not also a problem that, in a sense, the only people who understand what is going on in 
pharmaceutical companies are the pharmaceutical companies themselves, so it is really difficult to 
challenge their model? 
David Cooksey 
Absolutely. 
Michael Rawlins 
When you ask them, as I have done on many occasions, they still admit, in 2017 anyway, that they 
just charge what they think the market will bear.  
Tom Walley 
They charge what the US market will bear then try to get the rest of the world to pay. 
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Michael Rawlins 
That is why NICE is keen to get discounts, it has been so important. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes, indeed. 
Brian Edwards 
Nick, what do we learn about the government putting money into dementia?  How much of that is 
research and how much is treatment?  Is that what we want governments to do, to pick out disease 
areas and put a load of money in? [2h55’58] 
Sally Davies 
It was David Cameron who decided that there were a couple of areas he wanted to really push.  One 
was dementia and he supported me a lot on antimicrobial resistance.  I started off quite sceptical; I 
have come around.  By getting us all to put money in, the Medical Research Council led the setting 
up of the Dementia Research Institute, it has pulled in more money and more focus.  We put more 
money in, all of it linked to the dementia platform.  Although we do not have an answer yet, the 
people in it are challenging the beta amyloid theory, which is good.  We need people continuing to 
work on the standard theories and others coming in and challenging.  We have more work going on 
on how to care for patients, how to diagnose them earlier, all sorts of things that would not have 
happened if the Prime Minister had not said, ‘I am going to do this’ and had a report every six 
months about what was happening.  It was driven from No 10 very hard.  We had a committee that 
met with dementia experts, all the funders and everything. 
David Cooksey 
One of the things that David Cameron started was the Dementia Discovery Fund, which is run by 
SVLS, but was initially funded with £15 million from the Department of Health.36  It is having its 
final closing tomorrow at £250 million, with some extremely eminent investors in it, but the 
government has put in £15 million more through the British Business Bank. [2h57’42] That 
£30 million from government has generated £250 million and I sit on the advisory committee on 
behalf of the government and they are making some good progress.  I am not saying they have got 
anywhere near a solution, but – 
Sally Davies 
That is also quite interesting, because it started off with Cameron saying he wanted it and the 
Department must do that, then the bureaucrats got going and could not do it.  I do not know whether 
it was Cameron or the Cabinet Secretary who brought you in, but you managed to sort it by bringing 
in the private sector to help sort it out and run it and then to raise some money.  We do have to look 
at what government can do and what they are not very good at. 
                                                 
36 SVLS is SV Life Sciences Managers LLP, a healthcare and life sciences venture capital and growth 
equity firm. 
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Keith Peters 
We need to be very careful about this.  The fact of the matter is that one reason dementia has done 
so badly is that there has been a paucity of good new ideas.  People with a view of the history of the 
MRC would point out that Lloyd George started the MRC because of tuberculosis, a problem that 
needed to be solved.  Let me remind you Nixon went into fixing cancer in the 1970s and that 
resulted in an awful lot of money being wasted; luckily, a bit of it laid the foundation for 
understanding retroviruses and HIV.  The importance of the system that we have enjoyed in this 
country is that, by and large, politicians are kept away from decisions of how money should be 
spent.   
John has pointed out that there is a realpolitik about this.  I, personally, think the Dementia Fund is 
a mistake.  I have seen a lot of dementia research in the last 10 years and most of it is based on 
ideas that were formulated in the 1970s and most of it has not delivered.  Now, of course, there will 
be good new ideas, but they are not going to come top down, they are going to come from investing 
in brilliant basic scientists who want to understand the basic processes and that kind of money, 
frankly, is much better spent by the MRC. 
David Cooksey 
We would agree with you on that, Keith.  There is no question about that at all.  This Fund is there 
to take on the ideas from the brilliant scientists – 
Keith Peters 
But you know it’s not early treatment and clinical trials and so on.  I am not an expert, but I know a 
bit about it and there are not enough good ideas in the system yet. 
David Cooksey 
I would agree with you. [3h00’29] 
Keith Peters 
It is just like cancer was in the 1970s, I feel. 
David Cooksey 
Yes, and that is why we have given this thing a very long runway.  It is not the usual 10-year fund, 
it is nearer a 20-year fund. 
Iain Chalmers 
Last week or the week before, I spent three days in Hanover at a meeting about translational 
research in the neurosciences, which was set up by a professor from Berlin and a professor from 
California.  The mood was very down about, basically, the failure of many attempts to translate 
what seemed to be good ideas into something that might be useful for patients.  One of the themes 
that came up again and again was that because so much of this early research is secret people keep 
on going up the same blind alleys.  That is because the contract research organisation that has done 
trials for one company on a particular hopeful stream, is not allowed to tell the next company that 
asks them to do a trial with a similar agent what they have found.  There is absolutely built in 
redundancy and inefficiency into the ways that things currently are.  There was a paper by 
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Glenn Begley and Ellis published in Nature about four years ago, where they were writing from 
Amgen and saying that they had been unable to replicate 40 of the 44 proposed exciting things and 
they raised the question about the quality of the preclinical research that was being done.37  What 
was really exciting about this downbeat mood was it moved people from that world to saying, ‘We 
have to do something about this.  We have to start doing better designed trials on animals that look 
at appropriate sample sizes instead of 15 and 20 animals as a basis for going forward to human 
research.  We have to register the trials and we have to bloody well publish what we find, otherwise 
this built in inefficiency is going to remain’.   There are some fundamental things that have to be 
looked at in that world of research and its quality before it is going to be possible to see more 
productivity coming from brilliant people’s ideas, but then handled efficiently from a research 
perspective. 
 
Impact 
Nick Timmins 
Right.  I want to keep the story moving forward, because there is about a quarter of an hour to go.  
We have done OSCHR, in a sense.  What is the next thing that matters?  Academic health science 
centres (AHSCs) and networks are beginning to emerge, how does that all plug into this, or does it 
not? 
Sally Davies 
It does not.  These were concepts that came out of Ara Darzi’s – 
Nick Timmins 
High quality care for all.38 
Sally Davies 
Yes, that.  He is right about what he wants, which is to extend the social engineering we manage 
with BRCs to bring in the delivery of healthcare and the university much closer together across the 
broad bit.  It was unrelated to us.  It was a competition, though we ran the first competition and it 
was pretty messy, for academic health science centres.  You either are or you are not.  Given the 
names, it does not matter that much.   
The networks were also a great idea to broaden to health economies.  They were a particularly good 
idea not just in concept but when there was going to be money associated with them, but as the 
money dwindled after the concept and telling people they had them, they have had less impact than 
we would all like to see them have.  They do keep being given roles from the Accelerated Access 
Review and things, but it feels a bit like your classic Christmas tree.  What happens in DH and the 
NHS is something is set up and it works well, so along they come – ‘they’ being ministers or senior 
officials – and say, ‘We need this doing.  Oh, they are doing really well and it is not that far away 
                                                 
37 C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, ‘Drug development: Raise standards for preclinical cancer research’, 
Nature 483, 531–533 (29 March 2012).  
38 High Quality Care for All (Department of Health, London: 2008).  
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from what they do, so let us give it to them’, so you get these Christmas trees that then fall over, 
because they have lost their focus and never got enough money to do it or staff.  Does that sound 
right to you? 
One of the reasons NIHR is a success is I have what are known as sharp elbows.  We have never 
done a Christmas tree.  I would not take the AHSCs or the networks, but we helped them.  They are 
great concepts, in some places they worked, the competition made people up their thinking and 
their games, but have they delivered across the nation?   
Nick Timmins 
Yes, and the enthusiasm for them comes and goes, does it not, over the years, a bit. 
Sally Davies 
Although it is not that they are not the right idea: they are. 
Nick Timmins 
Yes, right. 
Colin Blakemore 
Just some thoughts about the immediate past and the future, good news and bad news.  The good 
news is developments that perhaps were not so much anticipated at the time of Cooksey.  The 
emphasis on genetics, genomic research, 100,000 Genomes and the huge investment in that area 
which, apart from cancer, is slow to deliver, but we all feel very strongly that it will eventually 
deliver very positive growth in the development of new treatments and the stratification of patient 
classification and organisation of medicine and clinical care in new respects.  The other is the 
interaction of the UK Biobank.  It is a slow burn.  It is a long-term investment, which of course DH 
is involved in as well as MRC and Wellcome.  It is just now beginning increasingly to deliver really 
important evidence and will continue to do so: it is a massive cohort. 
On the downside, I am very surprised that no one has mentioned the problem of record keeping and 
the increasing impact of data confidentiality and concerns about data handling, which have certainly 
impacted on the capacity of the NHS to deliver fully an understanding of disease.  That was part of 
the great promise the NHS, because of uniform systems and record keeping and everything, really 
would deliver.  I do not know what others feel, starting with the failure of Connecting for Health 
and then the impact of the increasing concerns about data confidentiality.  Is that going to be a 
restriction on what NIHR can do, what clinical science can deliver in general? 
Sally Davies 
Just so you know, it is NIHR that has funded Genomics England and the 100,000 Genomes Project 
as an infrastructure project and we did it in a very novel way.  With the support of the 
Cabinet Secretary, I persuaded the Secretary of State that we would set it up as an entrepreneurial 
start-up company, which gives subsequent ministers some indigestion.  One of the things they are 
doing – it is going to be, it is agreed – is setting up the NHS in England Genomics Database.  It will 
hold all the genomic data behind the NHS firewall, linked to NHS Digital, so we’ll get all the HES 
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data.39 [3h08’33] They should be signing tomorrow an agreement with a company, following an 
NHS procurement on their behalf, to get the software ready for October to suck much more clinical 
data, phenotype data, out of all the different hospitals’ systems into that.  We are going to have an 
amazing platform and we now have to use that – and this is where I am optimistic, having met 
Fiona Watt and talked it through – to move to platform funding in the way that we do in particle 
physics and astronomy.40  Meaning that when the MRC, Wellcome or ourselves fund a clinical 
study or a study with patients, we make sure that all the data goes into that database so that it is 
available to the clinician, because the treating clinician can get it, but it is also available for people 
to come back to and look at in different ways.  As we get more biomarkers and more genomics into 
that platform, we could become extraordinarily powerful.  As we have an agreement that 
NHS England, in commissioning its new genomics medicine service, will fund a large number, I 
have forgotten how many, I think it is 60,000 a year whole genomes, this is going to get bigger and 
bigger with whole genomes as well as the exomes and the arrays.  We have a real opportunity 
within the NHS firewall to access that data, as academics, researchers and as industry.  That 
changes it around; instead of taking data out and asking patients’ permission, keeping it in the 
firewall and going in, having got the proper permissions and training, could give us great dividends. 
Nick Timmins 
Does anyone else have a view on that? 
Michael Rawlins 
It is the same sort of area, but NIHR and NHRA co-sponsor the Clinical Practice Research Datalink 
(CPRD), which actively has nine million people on it and 25 million people historically, so we are 
getting there, but Care.data was a disaster.41  With CPRD, patients can opt out and over the 20 years 
it has operated about 2,000 have opted out.  Within a month of Care.data, 80,000 opted out. Now, 
when you’ve got a total of 5, or 6, or 7 million, it’s not a very big deal, but it was mainly – and  I 
am sorry to say this – middle class women. 
Nick Timmins 
You might be alright in those examples, but a lot of social science researchers are in despair about 
the ability to share data. 
Marc Taylor 
Is this not the big anxiety and the big opportunity, and the NIHR, probably more than other actors in 
the field, has built the capacity and has, if you like, the legitimate place to do more explaining, to 
convince more people that it is a good thing that science should make use of their health data, with 
the right sort of protection.  It is important for two reasons that somebody should seize this 
problem.  First of all, there have been these scandals, as presented, and the state of the law makes 
things worse.  We have an EU regulation that is coming in and is being translated into domestic 
law, which defeats anybody to read it and understand it.  Alongside that, you have the law on 
confidentiality.  It is beyond most people to understand what on earth is going on in this area, so 
that seems, to me, to be a really significant difficulty that someone needs to seize. 
                                                 
39 HES: Hospital Episode Survey. 
40 Professor Fiona Watt FRS has been selected as the government's preferred candidate to be the Executive 
Chair of the MRC when it becomes a constituent part of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in April 
2018.  
41 Care.data was an NHS data-sharing project, launched in 2013 and closed in 2016. 
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On the positive side, most of us here, the older ones, went to university when hardly anybody 
studied science and most people believed in arnica, so you have a massive opportunity, particularly 
with the improved education of women in scientific subjects, to change the understanding and the 
view amongst the general public about what is going on in this area. 
Nick Timmins 
We have five minutes left and I have two more questions it is worth having a go at.   
Brian Edwards 
A prediction.  My bet is that the bigger Trusts and the bigger commissioning organisations, as they 
are blocked up, will get back into the research business by appointing their own research officers. 
Sally Davies 
They already have.  They are working with us and funded by us. 
Nick Timmins 
Brian, just hear the last two questions and then we will have a chat.  One is, we have talked a lot 
about the positive impact of all this, are there disappointments that remain?  Linked to that, what 
should happen next? 
Keith Peters 
One thing that is happening in the whole system, which bothers me, being in one of the beneficiary 
towns, Cambridge, and Oxford the same, is that to them that hath has been given a great deal more 
and to those that have not they are starved.  I worry that we will have isolated brilliant areas with 
tremendous resources and then deserts.  I said earlier that I hoped the networks would spread the 
culture of research right across the NHS, but the truth of the matter is even within one institution 
there are people who are major beneficiaries of the system and the others are sweating in 
outpatients.  I do not know what the solution to it is, but I do worry that that is happening. 
Kieran Walshe 
Building on what Keith and Brian said, the story of NIHR is one of a number of notable successes 
about research production and research infrastructure; the gap or the problem remains the 
engagement of the system in the use of knowledge to bring about innovation and change.  It was 
interesting, that earlier discussion about the MRC, NIHR and others.  I think people in the NHS, 
senior managers and leaders, saw all of that as a bun fight going on between different factions 
within the research community, which was really pretty irrelevant to them.   
One of the adverse consequences of taking the money out of the NHS has been to strip capacity; it 
is the point that Brian was making.  If you talk to people on boards in the NHS now, there is a 
limited understanding of research and innovation.  That is partly because we have turned research 
from an intramural to an extramural activity for those organisations.  Going back to an earlier point 
I made, if, in this room, you had a bunch of senior NHS leaders, chief executives and so on, the 
issues that would be concerning them would be things like productivity and efficiency, demand 
management, flow, the interface between self-care and professional care, the workforce, service 
integration, and it remains true that NIHR is not addressing those issues very effectively.  The 
weakness, therefore, is that if NIHR in the future is going to need support – the point John made 
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earlier about the support of a community that says, ‘We really value what you do and we think it is 
really useful’ – from those NHS leaders, there is some way to go to get them on board even now. 
Peter Sneddon 
I am formerly of the DH R&D, currently of one of the largest NHS Trusts in the country and 
regularly attending the NHS Trust’s board in order to talk about research, promote research and 
report to them on research.  I can certainly say, contrary to Kieran’s concern, that our Trust is 
intimately engaged in research and wants to contribute as much as it can, primarily because it sees 
that as a way of serving its patients better.  The idea that into the NHS constitution Sally and others 
manage to put research as part of the integrated service of what the NHS is providing is extremely 
powerful.  Our board must be focused on producing that service of getting our patients into research 
and they do see that. 
One of the other reasons that I am able to communicate to our board the value of NIHR is 
something that Sally and her team took an enormous amount of time in order to set up and that was 
around the metrics and the performance-based allocation of funding, so that you get more funding, 
can do more research and you will get more money.  That is a very persuasive argument to the 
board and it has worked on a number of occasions.   
Nick Timmins 
To pick up Keith’s points, you are talking about an extremely large Trust and Kieran might be 
talking about Kidderminster. [3h18’47] 
Kieran Walshe 
I am involved with a research-active Trust as well and there are some Trusts that take much more 
interest in research, but it is interesting.  You presentation, Peter, is conceiving of research as an 
income stream for the organisation.  In fact, research should be an investment by the organisation in 
the future development of innovation and advantage and that is not how very many NHS 
organisations see it.  They think, ‘Okay, if we do research we get money from NIHR.  We are a site 
for research’.  That is not the attitude you would see in other industries. 
Peter Sneddon 
It is not about bringing the money in; it is about the value that the research brings to the NHS and 
its patients and how it transforms their treatment, etc. 
Nick Timmins 
We really are running out of time.  What should happen next?  Does anyone have any great ideas on 
what needs to happen next? 
Keith Peters 
Clone Sally. 
[Laughter] 
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Nick Timmins 
We just need a big round of Mustang Sally and that would be fine.  Can I just say thank you very 
much for coming?  Unless anyone has anything burning to say, it is really good of you to get here, I 
hope you all get home. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Sally Sheard 
I just wanted to say thank you very much.  Thank you, Nick, for chairing, because I know this is 
slightly out of your comfort zone.  For me, this has been a tremendously useful afternoon.  I have 
learnt an enormous amount and I hope you have learnt something as well.  There is an active role 
for history in these very contemporary policy debates and issues.  George [Binney] asked me earlier 
how I would describe myself, and I bill myself as a ‘useful historian’.  I know Tom [Walley] was a 
bit dismayed to inherit a department where he had a historian in residence and he was not quite sure 
what to do with me.  I hope this has given you some ideas.  We have learnt a lot about the 
importance of collaboration, community, competition.  We have fleshed out some of those niggles 
that we had about relationships between MRC, DH, NIHR and we are better for it, so thank you 
very much. 
Nick Timmins 
Thank you very much indeed. [3h21’08] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
